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The Summary Judgment In California:
The Case for Judicial Reform
By LEON T. DAvID*
THE summary judgment has come of age. Once considered a
novel procedure, under suspicion if not disfavor, it has pushed legal
gamesmanship aside in the search for probable truth m civil litiga-
tion. The summary judgment procedure provides an early show-
down in that search. It is well designed to unburden trial calendars
by discovering and terminating unmeritonous litigation1 and by dis-
posing of sham or vexatious litigation.2 Where there is no defense
to a cause, the plaintiff may receive a speedy judgment. Similarly,
where there is no cause, or the cause is ineffective, the defendant may
receive early relief.4
Summary judgment procedures have been embraced in the
California statutes for almost fifty years. There have been over three
hundred reported appellate decisions on the subject. Statutory
* Judge of the Superior Court, Los Angeles County, 1953-1967 (retired);
Judge, Municipal Court, Los Angeles, 1950-1953; A.B., 1924, J.D., 1926, Stanford
Umversity; M.S. 1937 and Dr. Pub. Adm. 1957, Umv. of So. California; faculty,
School of Law, Umversity of So. California, 1931-1934; faculty, School of Public
Administration, Civic Center Division, University of So. California, 1946-1966. Pn-
vate practice and deputy city attorney, Palo Alto, Calif. 1927-1931; assistant and
senior assistant city attorney, Los Angeles, 1934-41, 1945-1950.
1. Martens v. Winder, 191 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 12 Cal. Rptr. 413, 416
(1961); Barry v. Rodgers, 141 Cal. App. 2d 340, 342, 296 P.2d 898, 900 (1956).
2. Maltby v. Shook, 131 Cal. App. 2d 349, 354, 280 P.2d 541, 544 (1955);
Bank of Amienca v. Oil Well Supply Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 265, 270, 55 P.2d 885, 888
(1936); cf. Wilson v. Bittick, 63 Cal. 2d 30, 403 P.2d 159, 45 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1965)
(disapproval of procedural maneuvering); Mansfield v. Kaiser, 176 Cal. App. 2d 632,
636, 1 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (1959); Neal v. Bank of America, 93 Cal. App. 2d 678,
682, 209 P.2d 825, 827 (1949) (leading case on sham pleading). See generally Com-
ment, The Vexatious Litigant, 54 CALiF. L. REV. 1769 (1966).
3. Ford Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 3d 442, 447, 94 Cal. Rptr.
127, 130 (1971).
4. Larsen v. Johannes, 7 Cal. App. 3d 491, 86 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1970); Barry v.
Rodgers, 141 Cal. App. 2d 340, 343, 296 P.2d 898, 900 (1956).
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changes in the procedure all have been directed toward enlarging its
applicability and scope. The summary judgment statute has been the
subject of commentaries by several writers.' Pet, the litigant often
hesitates to use the procedure. This hesitation is due in large part
to the existence of folklore; namely, the summary judgment pro-
cedure is not favored by the courts, and making a motion for sum-
mary judgment is an exercise in futility
Although there have been many reversals of summary judgments
by the appellate courts, there also have been an imposing array of af-
firmances. Professor John Bauman viewed this record and made
the largely unwarranted assumption that successful motions for sum-
mary judgment were, in reality, sub rosa determinations of the relative
weight of evidence. 6 Predicted upon the apparent lack of predic-
tability upon appeal, Bauman proclaimed the need for a standard.
Judge Ernest J Zack, after experience with summary judgments gained
in a law and motion department, also has viewed the record. 7 Un-
like Professor Bauman, who did not propose concrete standards, Zack
concluded that legislation was required to limit the oscillations of os-
tensible judicial discretion in the application of the Califorma sum-
mary judgment statute .
A further study of the mass of decisions reveals that most of
the problems exposed by these writers can be resolved into one-
the reversals of summary judgments by the appellate courts upon
grounds which apparently contravene the express provisions of section
437c of the California Code of Civil Procedure.9 This article ex-
plores some of these decisions and reaches the conclusion that the
California Supreme Court itself has not departed from the terms of
section 437c. It is also concluded that the confusion in several
5. Clary, Summary Judgments, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
847 et. seq. (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1957) (very reliable and thoughtful as of the
date when published); 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Proceedings Without Trial,
Summary Judgment, §§ 173-200 (2d ed. 1971). The scope of all of the various pro-
cedures without trial is necessarily relevant to the employment of motions for sum-
mary judgment. The history of early summary judgment procedures is outlined in
Fisher v. Sun Underwriters Inc. Co., 55 R.I. 175, 179 A. 702 (1935). See also
Yankwich, Summary Judgment Under Federal Practice, 40 CALIF L. REV 204 (1952).
6. Bauman, California Summary Judgment: A Search for a Standard, 10
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 347 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Bauman]. Bauman apparently over-
looked many elements of the statutory and decisional law, some of which are considered
infra.
7 Zack, California Summary Judgment: The Need for Legislative Reform,
59 CALIF L. REv. 439 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Zack].
8. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 437c (West 1973).
9. Id.
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courts of appeal is the direct result of the denial of hearings by the
supreme court in summary judgment cases of opposite polarity. If
that is so, the remedy is clear. In any appropriate case, the supreme
court could restate the governing principles and disapprove the deci-
sions which are out of line. If there has been a departure from the
directions of section 437c, it does not appear that the enactment
of more legislation will be a remedy in the first instance. The judicial
remedy is easier and quicker.
Completing our discussion, further suggestions will be set forth,
both as to procedure and doctrine, which would help to make the
summary judgment procedure consistent and effective for the pur-
poses intended.
The Summary Judgment: An Overview
The appellate decisions reflect a wide range of legal controversies
in which the summary judgment procedure has been employed.'0 The
10. Suits on promissory notes: Bank of America v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App.
3d 435, 84 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1970); Fisher v. Cheeseman, 260 Cal. App. 2d 503, 67
Cal. Rptr. 258 (1968); Indiana Plumbing Supply Co. v. Bank of America, 255 Cal.
App. 2d 910, 63 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1967) (recovery from bank on forged endorse-
ment); Slocum v. Nelson, 72 Cal. App. 2d 33, 163 P.2d 888 (1945); Kelly v. Liddicoat,
35 Cal. App. 2d 559, 96 P.2d 186 (1939); Bank of America v. Casady, 15 Cal. App.
2d 163, 59 P.2d 444 (1936); Bank of America v. Oil Well Supply Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d
265, 55 P.2d 885 (1936). Defamation: Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,
62 Cal. 2d 412, 398 P.2d 785, 42 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1965); Rader v. Thrasher, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 883, 99 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1972). Injunction: Loma Portal Civic Club v.
American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964)
(Flight operations from airport). Pirating of literary composition: Desny v. Wilder,
46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956). Property settlement agreement: Freidberg v.
Freidberg, 9 Cal. App. 3d 754, 88 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1970). False arrest and imprison-
ment: Miller v. Glass, 44 Cal. 2d 359, 282 P.2d 501 (1955); Lacy v. Laurentide Fin.
Corp., 28 Cal. App. 3d 251, 104 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972) (also abuse of process);
Leggett v. Di Giorgio Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 306, 80 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1969). Mal-
icious prosecution: Rich v. Siegel, 7 Cal. App. 3d 465, 86 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1970);
Kassan v. Bledsoe, 252 Cal. App. 2d 810, 60 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1967). Specific per-
formance: Towne Dev. Co. v. Lee, 63 Cal. 2d 147, 403 P.2d 724, 45 Cal. Rptr. 316
(1965); Crescenta Valley Moose Lodge No. 808 v. Bunt, 8 Cal. App. 3d 682, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 428 (1970). Foreclosure of mechanic's lien: R.D. Reeder Lathing Co. v.
Allen, 66 Cal. 2d 373, 425 P.2d 785, 57 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1967); Daugherty Co. v. Kim-
berly-Clark Corp., 14 Cal. App. 3d 151, 92 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1971); Lewis v. Arboles
Dev. Co., 8 Cal. App. 3d 812, 87 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1970). Wrongful death: Barker v.
Wah Low, 19 Cal. App. 3d 710, 97 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1971); Coleman v. Fitzgerald, 252
Cal. App. 2d 58, 60 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1967). Will contest, undue influence: Estate
of Kerner, 275 Cal. App. 2d 785, 80 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1969); Estate of Niquette,
264 Cal. App. 2d 976, 71 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1968). Administrator's action, recovery of
assets: Graham v. Bank of Cal., 197 Cal. App. 2d 438, 17 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1961).
Usury, invalidation of agreement: Wilson v. Wilson, 54 Cal. 2d 264, 352 P.2d 725,
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Code of Civil Procedure section 437c is now made applicable by its
5 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1960); Lee v. Marchetti, 4 Cal. App. 3d 97, 84 Cal. Rptr. 55
(1970). Adoption proceedings: Adoption of Backhaus, 209 Cal. App. 2d 13, 25
Cal. Rptr. 581 (1962). Inverse condemnation: Joslin v. Marm Municipal Water Dist.,
67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967). Recovery of taxes paid:
General Motors Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 3d 229, 486 P.2d 163, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 635 (1971); Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 268 Cal. App. 2d 343,
73 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1968); Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. City & County of San
Francisco, 202 Cal. App. 2d 358, 20 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1962). Governmental liability-
Pianka v. State, 46 Cal. 2d 208, 293 P.2d 458 (1956); Dawson v. Rash, 160 Cal.
App. 2d 154, 324 P.2d 959 (1958). Determination of water rights: Miller & Lux,
Inc. v. Bank of America, 212 Cal. App. 2d 719, 28 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1963). Action
upon judgment: Reich v. Yow, 249 Cal. App. 2d 12, 57 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1967). Anti-
trust action: Corwin v. Los Angeles Newspaper Serv. Bureau, 4 Cal. 3d 842, 484 P.2d
953, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1971). Action upon lease: Shea v. Leonis, 29 Cal. App. 2d
184, 84 P.2d 277 (1938); Lee v. DeForest, 22 Cal. App. 2d 351, 71 P.2d 285 (1937).
Unlawful detainer" Univ. of S. Cal. v. Weiss, 208 Cal. App. 2d 759, 25 Cal. Rptr. 475
(1962). Foreclosure deficiencv" Ware v. Heller, 63 Cal. App. 2d 817, 148 P.2d 410
(1944); Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Cryer, 39 Cal. App. 2d 757, 104 P.2d 66 (1940).
Action to recover commissions: Hayward Tamkin & Co. v. Carpenteria Inv. Co.,
265 Cal. App. 2d 617, 71 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1968) (loan broker); Gillespie v. Hagan,
94 Cal. App. 2d 566, 211 P.2d 9 (1949) (real estate broker). Alimony claim against
estate: Gosnell v. Webb, 66 Cal. App. 2d 518, 152 P.2d 463 (1944). Pension rights:
Loveland v. City of Oakland, 69 Cal. App. 2d 399, 159 P.2d 70 (1945). Suit for
wages, under collective bargaining agreement: Hagin v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
152 Cal. App. 2d 93, 312 P.2d 356 (1957). Judgment, invalidation for want of
service: Eagle Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Keener, 247 Cal. App. 2d 246, 55 Cal. Rptr. 444
(1966). Judgment, res judicata: Norris v. San Mateo County Title Co., 37 Cal. 2d
269, 231 P.2d 493 (1951); Edwards v. City of Chico, 28 Cal. App. 3d 148, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 481 (1972) (jurisdiction of W.C.A.B. on employee's claim); Sanpietro v. Collins,
250 Cal. App. 2d 203, 58 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1967) (claiming also want of service).
Insurance coverage: Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 276 Cal. App. 2d 559,
81 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1969). Vehicle forfeiture, narcotics: People v. One 1964 Chevrolet
Corvette Convertible, 274 Cal. App. 2d 720, 79 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1969). Recovery of
deposit, sales agreement: Cf. Fabbro v. Dardi & Co., 93 Cal. App. 2d 247, 209 P.2d
9 (1949) (former judgment on pleadings procedure). Automobile collision, property
damage: Clovis Ready Mix Co. v. Aetna Freight Lines, 25 Cal. App. 3d 276, 101
Cal. Rptr. 820 (1972). Suit on contractor's bond: Rafeiro v. American Employers'
Ins. Co., 5 Cal. App. 3d 799, 85 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1970). Destruction of dogs by
pound: Romero v. County of Santa Clara, 3 Cal. App. 3d 700, 83 Cal. Rptr. 758
(1970). Negligence, multiple automobile collisions: Harding v. Purtle, 275 Cal. App.
2d 396, 79 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1969); Bewley v. Riggs, 262 Cal. App. 2d 188, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 520 (1968); Schroeter v. Lowers, 260 Cal. App. 2d 695, 67 Cal. Rptr. 270
(1968). Negligence, explosion of fuel tank: Hoover v. City of Fresno, 272 Cal. App.
2d 7, 77 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1969) (also involving municipal liability question). Injury to
seaman, Jones Act: Dixon v. Grace Lines, Inc., 27 Cal. App. 3d 278, 103 Cal. Rptr.
595 (1972). Actions over for indemnity- Freightliner Corp. v. Rockwell--Standard
Corp., 2 Cal. App. 3d 115, 82 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1969) (collateral estoppel in relation to
indemnity); Southern Pac. Co. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d
809, 77 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1969). Pollution control orders, injunction: Orange County
Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d 109, 103 Cal. Rptr.
410 (1972). Tideland reclamation, injunction: Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. City
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terms to all actions and proceedings."' Most significant is the ex-
tension of the procedure to actions for declaratory relief.
12
Although the summary judgment procedure is designed to deter-
mne whether there are factual issues to be tried, it also has become
a useful method for determining issues of law upon stipulated or un-
disputed facts.' 3 Therefore, in evaluating the procedure, one should
of Alameda, 264 Cal. App. 2d 284, 70 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1968). Personal injuries,
condition of property- Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1968) (abolishing social guest doctrine); Avey v. County of Santa Clara,
257 Cal. App. 2d 708, 65 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1968); Jones v. Forburger, 248 Cal. App. 2d
64, 56 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1967). Personal injuries, automobile accident: Schroeter v.
Lowers, 260 Cal. App. 2d 695, 67 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1968). Compliance with claims
requirements, in public liability: Ruffino v. City of Los Angeles, 226 Cal. App. 2d
67, 37 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1964); Johnson v. City of Oakland, 188 Cal. App. 2d 181,
10 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1961); Whitson v. LaPay, 153 Cal. App. 2d 584, 315 P.2d 45
(1957). Compliance with claims provisions, probate: Estate of Middleton, 215 Cal.
App. 2d 324, 30 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1963). Suit to collect attorney's fees: Haupt v.
Charlie's Kosher Mkt., 17 Cal. 2d 843, 112 P.2d 627 (1941). Innkeeper's liability:
In a curious case, the defendant moved for summary judgment for the plaintiff in the
amount of maximum statutory liability of an innkeeper to a guest for property lost
while deposited for safekeeping. Gardner v. Jonathan Club, 35 Cal. 2d 343, 217
P.2d 961 (1950). Termination, moot controversy- Stanton v. Dumke, 64 Cal. 2d
199, 411 P.2d 108, 49 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1966).
11. CAL. CODE Civ. Pxoc. § 437c (West 1973); see, e.g., Stanton v .Dumke,
64 Cal. 2d 199, 207, 411 P.2d 108, 114, 49 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386 (1966); Taliaferro v.
Coakley, 186 Cal. App. 2d 258, 260, 9 Cal. Rptr. 529, 530 (1960) (applicable to
mandamus proceedings), overruling Loveland v. City of Oakland, 69 Cal. App. 2d
399, 159 P.2d 70 (1945).
12. E.g., Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d
276, 384 P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963) (rights of fire fighters' union versus
city charter and ordinance provisions); National Exhibition Co. v. City & County of
San Francisco, 24 Cal. App. 3d 1, 100 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1972) (provision of lease of
Candlestick Park); Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 872 (1969) (test validity of demand for street dedication as prerequisite to
zone change); Exchequer Acceptance Corp. v. Alexander, 271 Cal. App. 2d 1, 76
Cal. Rptr. 328 (1969) (to determine rights to trust deed and mortgage deposited as
collateral security for promissory note); Carew v. Hibermia Bank, 186 Cal. App. 2d
764, 9 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1960) (interpretation of by-laws, terms and conditions of de-
posit); Burke v. Hibermia Bank, 186 Cal. App. 2d 739, 9 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1960);
Walker v. Munro, 178 Cal. App. 2d 67, 2 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1960).
13. Where there is no material fact to be tried, the matter is one of law, and
the sole question is whether the claim of the moving party is tenable on the undis-
puted facts. It is the duty of the trial court to hear and determine the questions of law.
In Burke Concrete Accessories, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 773, 775, 87
Cal. Rptr. 619, 620 (1970), each party moved for summary judgment after the facts
were stipulated, and the court demed both motions. The court was ordered upon re-
mand of the case to determine the issue for one party or the other. See also General
Motors Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 3d 229, 486 P.2d 163, 95 Cal. Rptr. 635
(1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 1008 (1972); Loma Portal Civic Club v. American
Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 588, 394 P.2d 548, 552, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 712 (1964);
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not hastily conclude that reversals on appeal always are occasioned by
the trial court's failure to apply the statute properly The reversal
has frequently rested upon important questions of law, many of them
questions of first impression. 4
The procedure has frequently been used to decide whether a
matter is res judicata, 15 whether a statute is unconstitutional, 16 or
whether an action is barred by the statutes of limitation. 17  In addi-
tion, where the identity of a party charged, or his connection with the
circumstances upon which the cause of action is based is the question,
a motion for summary judgment has been effective to release one erro-
neously sued.'"
National Exhibition Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 24 Cal. App. 3d 1, 100
Cal. Rptr. 757 (1972) (effect of ticket tax on rights of lessee of Candlestick Park);
Vincent v. State, 22 Cal. App. 3d 566, 99 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1971) (validity of Cal.
Welf. & Inst'ns Code section 13700, relative to attendant care payments); Flournoy V.
State, 275 Cal. App. 2d 806, 80 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1969) (liability of state for concealed
hazard, icy bridge); Exchequer Acceptance Corp. v. Alexander, 271 Cal. App. 2d 1, 13,
76 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335 (1969) (where there are issues of law only, it is the duty of the
court to determine those issues); Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 268 Cal.
App. 2d 343, 346, 73 Cal. Rptr. 896, 898 (1968) (constitutional validity of prepay-
ment provision in franchise tax law, all facts being agreed upon); McKay v. Riverside
County, 175 Cal. App. 2d 247, 345 P.2d 949 (1959) (where the sole question is
whether a cause of action is stated, it is not technically a summary judgment procedure,
but a question of law that can be raised at any time); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v.
Claude Fisher Co., 161 Cal. App. 2d 431, 327 P.2d 78 (1958); Dawson v. Rash,
160 Cal. App. 2d 154, 324 P.2d 959 (1958) (governmental immunity in tort).
14. E.g., Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971)
(liability on the part of one who sold liquor to an intoxicated person, who thereafter
injured a person by drunk driving); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d
561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (abolishing the social guest doctrine in relation to land
use and occupation); Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956) (right to
recover for reasonable value of plaintiffs story used in a photoplay by defendant);
Pianka v. State, 46 Cal. 2d 208, 293 P.2d 458 (1956) (liability of state for injury
allegedly occasioned by explosion of a shell left by the National Guard on a public
firing range); Cox v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 301, 82 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1970) (state re-
sponsibility, damages from flood control project); Loveland v. City of Oakland, 69
Cal. App. 2d 399, 159 P.2d 70 (1945) (pension rights of a fireman's widow,
divorced, and then remarried).
15. E.g., Dryer v. Dryer, 231 Cal. App. 2d 441, 446, 41 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842
(1965); Smith v. City of Los Angeles, 190 Cal. App. 2d 112, 11 Cal. Rptr. 898
(1961).
16. E.g., Vincent v. State, 22 Cal. App. 3d 566, 99 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1971)
(Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code section 13700 unconstitutional); Jones-Hamilton Co. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 268 Cal. App. 2d 343, 73 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1968) (prepayment pro-
vision in franchise tax challenged by summary judgment procedure).
17 E.g., Wilson v. Bittick, 63 Cal. 2d 30, 403 P.2d 159, 45 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1965); Hopper v. Allen, 266 Cal. App. 2d 797, 72 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1968); Wilson v.
Peterson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 84, 214 P.2d 597 (1950).
18. E.g., Jordan v. Canale Foods, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 634, 93 Cal. Rptr. 348
[Vol. 25
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The California procedure also permits partial summary judg-
ments. 9 The judge may, by order, determine some of the issues and
leave the remaining issues for determination at trial. The partial
summary judgment can be a useful tool in judicial administration.
Whereas other pretrial procedures define the controverted contentions
of the parties, the partial summary judgment refines the matter fur-
ther by defining those issues upon which there is an evidentiary con-
flict. Section 437c requires that the final judgment shall "award judg-
ment as established by the proceedings herem provided for." This ap-
parently negates the power of a trial court to disregard the partial sum-
mary judgment in later proceedings.
General Evidentiary Considerations
Although the language of the statute refers only to affidavits, the
determination of a motion for summary judgment additionally may
be predicated on other forms of evidence and evidentiary presump-
(1971) (summary judgment for defendant, upon a showing it had no ownership or
control of truck which allegedly injured plaintiff); Roman Catholic Archbishop v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 3d 405, 93 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1971) (defendant who
claimed damages for failure of a Catholic order in Switzerland to deliver a dog pur-
chased by hun, sought recovery from the archbishop of San Francisco on a alter ego
theory); Chitwood v. County of Los Angeles, 14 Cal. App. 3d 522, 92 Cal. Rptr. 441
(1971) (county named defendant instead of Los Angeles County Flood Control Dis-
trict, the separate chargeable entity); Avey v. County of Santa Clara, 257 Cal. App.
2d 708, 65 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1968) (public agency not chargeable with traffic condition
at site of injury); Knudsen v. Faubus, 199 Cal. App. 2d 659, 19 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1962)
(potential liability defeated by showing that defendant's ownership of automobile was
legally transferred prior to event); Gorham v. Taylor, 176 Cal. App. 2d 600, 1 Cal.
Rptr. 546 (1959).
19. "If it appears that such defense applies only to a part of the plaintiffs claim,
or that a good cause of action does not exist as to a part of the plaintiff's claim, or
that any part of a claim is admitted or any part of a defense is conceded, the court
shall, by order, so declare, and the claim or defense shall be deemed established as to
so much thereof as is by such order declared and the cause of action may be severed
accordingly, and the action may proceed as to the issues remaining between the parties.
No judgment shall be entered prior to the termination of such action but the judgment
in such action shall, in addition to any matters determined in such action, award
judgment as established by the proceedings herein provided for. A judgment entered
under this section is an appealable judgment as m other cases." CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc.
§ 437c (West 1973). See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.
3d 229, 486 P.2d 163, 95 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1971) (in a suit to recover taxes, the supreme
court reversed a summary judgment, but ordered that a partial summary judgment be
entered as to certain items); Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 154 Cal. App. 2d 495, 316 P.2d
393 (1957); Murphy v. Kelley, 137 Cal. App. 2d 21, 32, 289 P.2d 565, 571 (1955)
(entitled to recover personal property, although issue of damages was to be tried); Lee
v. DeForest, 22 Cal. App. 2d 351, 71 P.2d 285 (1937) (segregate portions of claim
barred by statute of limitations).
November 19731
tions. These include admissions,20 depositions,2' requests for admis-
22232sions, responses to interrogatories,23 transcripts of a previous trial24
and matters subject to judicial notice.25 The presentation of oral
testimony at the hearing on the motion is disapproved.26
It has been customary for the affidavit to carry the self-serving
declaration that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, could testify
competently to that which is set forth. Compliance with section 437c,
however, is determined by the nature of the affiant's testimony 21
Thus, he must state evidentiary facts within his personal knowledge.
Statements that he has such evidence,2" believes such evidence exists,29
or that he will show certain facts by undisclosed evidence 0 are in-
sufficient. Nor may a party present evidence which would not be
receivable at trial."'
Affidavits from other actions3 2 or previous motions are accept-
able.13  While a party is precluded by section 437c from using his
20. E.g., Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal. App. 2d 714, 716, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404,
406 (1967); Newport v. City of Los Angeles, 184 Cal. App. 2d 229, 7 Cal. Rptr. 497
(1960); Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Remler Co., 179 Cal. App. 2d 700, 703, 4 Cal. Rptr.
103, 105 (1960).
21. E.g., Estate of Kerner, 275 Cal. App. 2d 785, 789. 80 Cal. Rptr. 289, 292
(1969); Thomson v. Honer, 179 Cal. App. 2d 197, 3 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1960), citing
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2016(d) (West Supp. 1973).
22. E.g., Jack v. Wood, 258 Cal. App. 2d 639, 644, 65 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859
(1968).
23. E.g., Dixon v. Grace Lines, Inc., 27 Cal. App. 3d 278, 283, 103 Cal. Rptr.
595, 599 (1972); Newport v. City of Los Angeles, 184 Cal. App. 2d 229, 235, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 497, 501 (1960).
24. E.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 2 Cal. App. 3d 115,
119, 82 Cal. Rptr. 439, 442 (1969).
25. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 450-60 (West 1966); Seltzer v. Seltzer, 276 Cal.
App. 2d 137, 141, 80 Cal. Rptr. 688, 691 (1969).
26. Spencer v. Hiberma Bank, 186 Cal. App. 2d 702, 717, 9 Cal. Rptr. 867,
876 (1961).
27 Seltzer v. Seltzer, 276 Cal. App. 2d 137, 144, 80 Cal. Rptr. 688, 693
(1969); Kassan v. Bledsoe, 252 Cal. App. 2d 810, 60 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1967).
28. Fidelity Inv., Inc. v. Better Bathrooms, Inc., 146 Cal. App. 2d 896, 898, 304
P.2d 283, 284 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1956).
29. Avey v. County of Santa Clara, 257 Cal. App. 2d 708, 713, 65 Cal. Rptr.
181, 184 (1968).
30. Kassan v. Bledsoe, 252 Cal. App. 2d 810, 815, 60 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803
(1967).
31. Joslin v. Mann Mumcipal Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 148, 429 P.2d 889,
900, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388 (1967).
32. R.D. Reeder Lathing Co. v. Allen, 66 Cal. 2d 373, 380, 425 P.2d 785,
789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845 (1967).
33. Truslow v. Woodruff, 252 Cal. App. 2d 158, 165, 60 Cal. Rptr. 304, 308
(1967).
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own pleadings as an affidavit,3 4 he may rely on those of his adversary
to establish necessary facts.3 5
The Affiant
As a general rule, the affiant may state only those evidentiary
facts within his personal knowledge. However, Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 437c provides:
When the party resisting the motion appears in a representative
capacity, such as a trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, or
receiver, then the affidavit in opposition by such representative
may be made upon his information and belief.36
While the code recognizes an exception to the requirement of personal
knowledge for certain persons acting in a representative capacity, use
of the exception is limited to the party resisting the summary judg-
ment motion. As such, it has been of little importance in the re-
ported decisions. 2
Although he represents his client, an attorney does not come
within the exception. Affidavits filed by attorneys made upon in-
formation and belief are insufficient to raise a triable issue38 and
are usually rejected as heresay.39 Attorneys' affidavits have been
successfully employed to bring before the court documents,4" judicial
records, or other matters of which judicial notice may be taken."
34. Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Inc. Co., 70 Cal. 2d 432, 437, 450 P.2d
271, 274, 74 Cal. Rptr. 895, 898 (1969). In Coyne v. Krempels, 36 Cal. 2d 257,
262, 223 P.2d 244, 247 (1950), the court stated that if one might use his own pleading,
section 437c was nugatory.
35. Joslin v. Mann Municipal Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 148, 429 P.2d 889,
900, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388 (1967).
36. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 437c (West 1973).
37. This provision was involved in Polin v. Chung Ho, 8 Cal. App. 3d 673, 679,
87 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595-96 (1970) and Umon Bank & Trust Co. v. Fabiano, 137 Cal.
App. 2d 656, 290 P.2d 577 (1955). The custodian of ancient records concerning
which no living person can testify may validly make such an affidavit. Alameda
Conserv. Ass'n v. City of Alameda, 264 Cal. App. 2d 284, 70 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 906 (1969) (tide land grants).
38. Acguirre v. Southern Pac. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 636, 43 Cal. Rptr. 73
(1965).
39. Cf. Dixon v. Grace Lines, Inc., 27 Cal. App. 3d 278, 290, 103 Cal. Rptr.
595, 604 (1972); Jordan v. Canale Foods, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 634, 638, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 350 (1971); Hayward Union High School Dist. v. Madrid, 234 Cal. App.
2d 100, 113-14, 44 Cal. Rptr. 268, 276 (1965); Aguirre v. Southern Pac. Co., 232 Cal.
App. 2d 636, 640, 43 Cal. Rptr. 73, 76 (1965); Estate of Nelson, 227 Cal. App. 2d
42, 52, 38 Cal. Rptr. 459, 465 (1964).
40. Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 471, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665
(1963); Forgeron, Inc. v. Hansen, 169 Cal. App. 2d 832, 833, 338 P.2d 10, 11 (1959).
41. Stafford v. Ware, 187 Cal. App. 2d 227, 228, 9 Cal. Rptr. 706, 707 (1960)
(attorney's affidavit insufficient to raise any factual issue, but is sufficient to indicate
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Of course, where the attorney has personal knowledge of the facts
stated, his affidavit is acceptable.42
There is no prohibition on using the affidavits of expert wit-
nesses provided the general statutory requirements are met. Thus,
the expert's competency must be established and his testimony must
be based on facts personally observed or supported by the evidence.43
When expert testimony is offered by one party, the court should af-
ford the other a full opportunity to produce affidavits of experts in
opposition.
The Affidavit: Common Errors
Frequently, motions for summary judgment have been denied
because the litigants have failed to observe basic rules. A cause
thus has been sent on to trial because affidavits failed to support all
the essential elements of a cause of action or defense.44 Parties may
a former judgment, which could be considered as res judicata); Newport v. City of
Los Angeles, 184 Cal. App. 2d 229, 234, 7 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501 1960); cf. Jordan v.
Canale Foods, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 634, 637, 93 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350 (1971).
42. Dryer v. Dryer, 231 Cal. App. 2d 441, 449-50, 41 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844-45
(1965); Smith v. City of Los Angeles, 190 Cal. App. 2d 112, 118-19, 11 Cal. Rptr. 898,
902 (1961).
43. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal.
2d 33, 43-44, 442 P.2d 641, 648, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 568 (1968).
44. Relative to assignment relied upon: Arnold v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc'y,
23 Cal. 2d 741, 146 P.2d 684 (1944); Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d
226, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971) (assignor suing, not real party in interest); Kimber v.
Jones, 122 Cal. App. 2d 914, 265 P.2d 922 (1954). But cf. Reich v. Yow, 249
Cal. App. 2d 12, 17, 57 Cal. Rptr. 117, 120-21 (1967) (if no issue is raised concerning
assignment, it is not necessary to set forth facts concerning it). Filing of a claim as
condition of insurance: Gardenswartz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 23 Cal. App.
2d 745, 68 P.2d 322 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1937). Filing required claim under Public
Liability Act: Johnson v. City of Oakland, 188 Cal. App. 2d 181, 10 Cal. Rptr. 409
(1961). Facts relative to existence of partnership- Weichman v. Vetrl, 100 Cal.
App. 2d 177, 223 P.2d 288 (1950). Facts to show adequacy of consideration, where
specific performance is sought: Rodes v. Shannon, 194 Cal. App. 2d 743, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 349 (1961); House v. Lala, 180 Cal. App. 2d 412, 4 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1960). Effect
of bankruptcy discharge: Williams v. Winter, 206 Cal. App. 2d 474, 23 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1962). Applicability of statutes of limitation: Graham v. Bank of California,
197 Cal. App. 2d 438, 17 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1961); cf. Helfer v. Hubert, 208 Cal. App.
2d 22, 24 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1962) (fraud); Garlock v. Cole, 199 Cal. App. 2d 11, 16,
18 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 (1962) (relative to death statute commenced to run). Applica-
bility of the Statute of Frauds: Sinks v. Merrill, 222 Cal. App. 2d 200, 35 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1963); Haddad v. Electronic Prod. & Dev., Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 137, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1963); Winburn v. All American Sportswear Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 380,
30 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1963). Conspiracy- Burke v. Hibernia Bank, 186 Cal. App. 2d
739, 9 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1960). Collateral estoppel: Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal. App. 3d 442, 94 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1971).
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mistakenly think that if business records do not show a transaction,
such omission supports the contention that the transaction did not
occur. 5  Similarly, a defendant may move hastily for summary judg-
ment when his adversary's personal answers to interrogatories reveal an
ignorance of essential facts. Yet these facts may be within the per-
sonal knowledge of others.46 Also, an affidavit may destroy the
claim of the very party producing it by showing facts or knowledge
in derogation of the cause or defense.4
The requirements of the Evidence Code are operative in sum-
mary judgment proceedings. Most notably, hearsay evidence in the
affidavit is inadmissible.48  The presence of some hearsay in the
moving party's affidavit will not bar his victory if, disregarding the
hearsay, competent evidence is tendered on all material issues.49 How-
ever, where an opposing party fails to file affidavits, he does not
waive any deficiencies in the affidavits of the movant 50
It is m meeting section 437c's express evidentiary requirements
for affidavits that the greatest difficulty is encountered. Only facts
are acceptable. The affiants' "conclusions, personal opinions and
beliefs" are insufficient. 1  Legal conclusions are madmissible.8 2  An
45. Himes v. Club Rustico de la Playa, S.A., 6 Cal. App. 2d 356, 44 P.2d 395
(1935).
46. International Harvester Co. v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. App. 2d 652, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 515 (1969).
47. In Jordan v. City of Long Beach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 878, 95 Cal. Rptr. 246
(1971), the city showed that an alleged dangerous condition did not exist on its prop-
erty, but a photograph submitted with the affidavit showed the condition to be on
adjacent property. The city might have a duty to protect pedestrians from dangerous
conditions on that property. In Romero v. County of Santa Clara, 3 Cal. App. 3d 700,
705, 83 Cal. Rptr. 758, 761 (1970), the plaintiff sought to assert an estoppel, but by
affirmatively showing that defendant had relied upon the advice of an attorney, the
plaintiff destroyed the basis for estoppel. In Weir v. Snow, 210 Cal. App. 2d 283,
26 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1962), the plaintiff's attorney's affidavit showed knowledge which
started the statute of limitations runmng against his claim. Richter v. United Cal.
Theatres, Inc., 177 Cal. App. 2d 126, 1 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1960) (plaintiffs affidavit
raised questions of the existence of the contract alleged m the complaint).
48. Edwards v. City of Chico, 28 Cal. App. 3d 148, 104 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1972);
Coleman v. Fitzgerald, 252 Cal. App. 2d 58, 62, 60 Cal. Rptr. 173, 176 (1967);
Maltby v. Shook, 131 Cal. App. 2d 349, 280 P.2d 541 (1955); Shea v. Leoms, 29 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 84 P.2d 277 (1938).
49. Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 556-60, 122 P.2d 264,
266-68 (1942); Aguirre v. Southern Pac. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 636, 43 Cal. Rptr. 73
(1965).
50. Miley v. Harper, 248 Cal. App. 2d 463, 468, 56 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (1967);
Callahan v. Chatsworth Park, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 2d 597, 604, 22 Cal. Rptr. 606, 611
(1962).
51. Colvig v. KFSO, 224 Cal. App. 2d 357, 36 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1964); Kramer
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answering affidavit which is ambiguous, equivocal or conclusory will
not serve to raise an issue; nor will allegations on information and
belief concerning issues on which the affiant is chargeable with knowl-
edge.53
The difficulty is in distinguishing between facts and "ultimate
facts" or conclusions. By definition a "conclusion" is the inference
or deduction drawn from other basic facts. In pleading, a conclusion is
rejected because it frequently fails to reveal the premises upon which
it is based, making it difficult to controvert or admit. In evidence it
is rejected both as a usurpation of the province of the trier of fact,
and because it denies the adversary the chance to contest the facts
upon which it is based. The same reasoning underlies the require-
ment of section 437c that the facts be stated with particularity
Conceding that the distinction is not always easy to make, there
is no lack of precedent or agreement in respect to many often en-
countered conclusions.54 An impediment to resolution of the problem
is the practice of trial attorneys whereby witnesses are allowed without
objection to testify using "popular conclusions." 55  Allowing such
statements of a witness that he was the "owner" of certain property,
that he paid a certain bill, that it was "agreed," or that Y was his part-
v. Barnes, 212 Cal. App. 2d 440, 27 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1963); de Echeguren v. de Eche-
guren, 210 Cal. App. 2d 141, 26 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1962); Roehm Distrib. Co. v.
Burgermeister Brewing Corp., 196 Cal. App. 2d 678, 682, 16 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884
(1961); Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Remler Co., 179 Cal. App. 2d 700, 4 Cal. Rptr. 103
(1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. Fish, 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 333 P.2d 133 (1958);
Fidelity Investors, Inc. v. Better Bathrooms, Inc., 146 Cal. App. 2d 896, 304 P.2d 283
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1956); Barry v. Rodgers, 141 Cal. App. 2d 340, 296 P.2d 898
(1956); Schessler v. Keck, 138 Cal. App. 2d 663, 292 P.2d 314 (1956); Low v.
Woodward Oil Co., 133 Cal. App. 2d 116, 283 P.2d 720 (1955); Maltby v. Shook,
131 Cal. App. 2d 349, 280 P.2d 541 (1955).
52. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 111, 443 P.2d 561, 563, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 99 (1968); Romero v. County of Santa Clara, 3 Cal. App. 2d 700, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 758 (1970); Low v. Woodward Oil Co., 133 Cal. App. 2d 116, 283 P.2d 720
(1955); Weichman v. Vetn, 100 Cal. App. 2d 177, 223 P.2d 288 (1950).
53. Guyselman v. Ramsey, 179 Cal. App. 2d 802, 807, 4 Cal. Rptr. 133, 137
(1960).
54. E.g., Schoonover v. Birnbaum, 148 Cal. 548, 83 P 999 (1906) (allegation
of ownership held to be a mere conclusion of law); accord, Carlson v. Lmdauer, 119
Cal. App. 2d 292, 302, 259 P.2d 925, 930 (1953). See generally 32 C.J.S. Evidence
§ 453 et seq. (1964). Some common conclusions relate to agency, ownership, partner-
ship, existence or sufficiency of title, consummation of sale, delivery of a deed, aban-
donment of rights, validity of an instrument, authority of an agent, boundaries, duty,
excuse, indebtedness, payment, residence, whether or upon what conditions a contract
was made, the effect, meaning or purpose of a document, and that a gift was made.
See also 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 546 (1964) (in reference to negative statements).
55. See W.F Boardman Co. v. Petch, 186 Cal. 476, 199 P 1047 (1921).
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ner, may expedite the trial process when the issues which they address
are not material, but carried'over to affidavits, may pose serious prob-
lems of proof. On a motion for summary judgment there is no right
to waive objections to incompetent evidence. 56
In the summary judgment procedure the moving party confronted
with a conclusory affidavit should make his objections both orally and
in writing. His adversary should request the opportunity to provide,
if he can, any missing but necessary particulars in supplementary affi-
davits.
Such liberality should be more restricted when the plaintiff is the
movant, as the code prescribes that he establish by competent affidavit
every fact he is required to prove.57  Since he initiated the lawsuit, it
is expected that he has the necessary evidence to support his allegations
and the evidentiary details to support his "ultimate facts."
Contrary to the rule announced in many of the early cases, it now
is established that for a defendant to prevail upon a motion, it is only
necessary that he establish the nonexistence of one essential element
of the plaintiffs cause. It is not necessary that he successfully con-
test all of the elements.5
While it is established that a solely conclusory affidavit of the
resisting party is insufficient to raise triable issues of fact, the liberality
of some appellate decisions has tended, to a degree, toward abrogation
of the code requirement. The patchwork of precedent, varying from
appellate district to appellate district, and even between divisions in
the same district, calls for close scrutiny.
Affidavits of the Resisting Party
The intent of section 437c clearly expressed in its text is that
the same rule applies to both the resisting and the moving party: the
affidavits shall set forth facts with particularity and shall show af-
firmatively that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify com-
petently thereto.
The opinion has been expressed by Judge Zack that the rule has
become a "judicial casualty" when applied to the resisting party, due
56. Family Service Agency v. Ames, 166 Cal. App. 2d 344, 351, 333 P.2d 142,
146 (1958); Southern Pac. Co. v. Fish, 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 365, 333 P.2d 133, 141
(1958).
57. CAL. CoDn Crv. Poc. § 437c (West 1973).
58. See Joslin v. Marm Municipal Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 148-49, 429
P.2d 889, 900, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388 (1967); Hayward Tamkm & Co. v. Carpenteria
lnv. Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 617, 71 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1968).
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to the course of decisions in some courts of appeal. 59  Statements
of conclusions of law, conclusions of fact and hearsay have been held
sufficient to counter the moving party's affidavits. What perhaps is
involved is the resolution of a claimed conflict between the evidentiary
requirements of the code and a presumed judicial discretion.
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c reads:
the answer may be stricken out or the complaint may be dis-
missed and judgment may be entered, in the discretion of the
court, unless the other party, by affidavit or affidavits shall
show such facts as may be deemed by the judge hearing the motion
sufficient to present a triable issue of fact. 60
Considered alone, these clauses indicate that the summary judg-
ment might be denied, in the exercise of discretion, upon a showing
of any sort which would impel the judge to send the cause on for
trial. A considerable diversity of decisions in the appellate courts
leads one to infer that this has indeed been the approach of some
jurists.
The difficulty is that the "facts" upon which the decision is to
be made are those required to be presented in affidavits. Further,
the "facts" must be such that the affiant might competently testify
to them if called as a witness at the trial. Liberal construction of
such requirements cannot justify noncompliance with them.
The present provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c
regarding evidentiary requirements were derived from the former section
831 (d)4. During the ten years before section 437c made the
summary judgment procedure available in superior courts, the ap-
pellate department of the superior court was the court of last resort
for municipal court appeals. In two decisions, the appellate de-
partment in Los Angeles County superior court established the prin-
ciples concerning summary judgments.
In the first decision, Cowan Oil & Refining Co v Miley Pe-
troleum Corp.,6" the court rejected the contention that the standard
to be used in granting summary judgment should be based on cases
dealing with "speaking motions" to strike sham answers or motions
for judgment on the pleadings:
None of these cases, however, involve any such provision as
that found in section 831d. That section provides an entirely
new procedure, as far as the codes of our state are concerned, the
purpose of which is to eliminate all issues which have no basis in
59. Zack, supra note 7, at 466.
60. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 437c (West 1973) (emphasis added).
61. 112 Cal. App. 773, 295 P 504 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
fact, no matter how well they may be pleaded in form. Under
it, an answer may be stricken out, even though a perfect defense
may be stated therein, unless the defendant by hIs affidavits
shows facts to substantiate the defense. 62
Later, under section 437c, in Gardenswartz v Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 63 the court elaborated the rule:
Section 437c requires that affidavits presented on a motion for
summary judgment, whether by plaintiff or defendant, set forth
the facts "with particularity" and show that such facts are within
the personal knowledge of the affiant and that he can competently
testify thereto if sworn as a witness. Neither conclusions of law,
nor conclusions of fact, nor so-called ultimate facts are sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of this section. It requires the presenta-
tion in the affidavits of evidentiary facts sufficient to show a cause
of action or a defense, as the case my be. 64
Further refinement came in Krieger v Dennie.65  There the
court made it clear that it was not the function of the trial judge
to determine wherein, amidst conflicting statements, lies the truth.
The matter was not within the arbitrary discretion of the judge.
If the jury's belief of evidence given by a competent witness could
defeat plaintiffs claim at trial, his motion must be denied.66 (At
tis time, the defendant could not move for summary judgment.)
Later cases in the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
took no issue with these pronouncements in applying section 437c.61
But in a subsequent case m that district, a summary judgment
granted in the superior court became subject to the facile pen of Mr.
Justice Moore. In McComsey v. Leaf,68 an action for repayment
of a loan, the opposing affidavits did not dispute the payment of
$7255 by the plaintiff to the defendant. The sum was used by
defendant with plaintiff's evident approbation to build and equip a
photographic studio. Thereafter the defendant married plaintiff's
daughter. Later he was sued for divorce, and the plaintiff instituted
the action to regain the sum. The defendant asserted that the ad-
vance was a gift in consideration of the marriage. In his affidavit
he incidentally used conclusory terms such as gift.
62. Id. at 778, 295 P at 506.
63. 23 Cal. App. 2d 745, 68 P.2d 322 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1937).
64. id. at 754, 68 P.2d at 326.
65. 123 Cal. App. 777, 10 P.2d 820 (App. Dep't Super. CL 1932).
66. Id. at 780, 10 P.2d at 821.
67. Shea v. Leoms, 29 Cal. App. 2d 184, 84 P.2d 277 (1938); Lee v. DeForest,
22 Cal. App. 2d 351, 71 P.2d 285 (1937). Other appellate districts followed this
lead m Kelly v. Liddicoat, 35 Cal. App. 2d 559, 96 P.2d 186 (1939) (first district), and
Ross v. McDougal, 31 Cal. App. 2d 114, 87 P.2d 709 (1939) (fourth district).
68. 36 Cal. App. 2d 132, 97 P.2d 242 (1939).
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It appears obvious that under the terms of section 437c the
nature of the transaction was a disputed fact to be tried. The court
restated the principle that the plaintiff's affidavit must be strictly
construed, but added: "'An affidavit of defense, on the contrary, is
to be liberally construed, and, if its terms reasonably warrant the
inference that the defendant has a substantial defense to plaintiff's
claim, summary judgment ought not to be entered.' "69 The re-
quirements of Cowan and Gardenswartz were swept aside with a
statement that their conclusions were not supported by the cases
cited therein.
The dismissal of the Cowan and Gardenswartz statements re-
garding evidentiary requirements was not justified, however, since
they were based squarely on the statute rather than case law The
quotation or citation of authorities therein was to show that the
summary judgment procedure, novel to California, was known m
other states. They were also used to support the constitutionality of
section 437c, since issue, and not factual, determination was involved.
Having mutilated the evidentiary requirements of the statute, the
court held that there was compliance with its terms m this case.
The nature of the money advance was in dispute, and this question
required that the cause be tried. Thus, the actual holding of Mc-
Comsey is that where the opposing evidentiary affidavits disclose a
conflict in testimony which would be competent at trial, the inclusion
of some conclusions of fact, law or ultimate fact m an affidavit does
not vitiate it.
The court made another statement which seems to have gener-
ated erroneous conceptions concerning the statutory requirements:
Upon a consideration of these authorities and the statute, the
better rule appears to be that to warrant a summary judgment
there "must be a failure on the part of defendant to satisfy
the court that there is any basis for his denial or any truth in his
defense" and that unless the defendant does so fail, the
case should proceed to a deliberate trial in the usual course. 70
Standing alone, this statement is not repugnant to the require-
ment of section 437c that such factors must be determined by the
evidentiary statements in defendant's opposing affidavits."' But in
69. Id. at 140, 97 P.2d at 246-47, quoting from Wyatt v. Madden, 32 F.2d 838,
839 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
70. 36 Cal. App. 2d at 140, 97 P.2d at 247, quoting from Curry v. MacKenzie,
239 N.Y 267, 146 N.E. 375 (1925); accord, Grueninger v. Livingston & Co., 90 Cal.
App. 2d 266, 274, 202 P.2d 785, 790 (1949); Slocum v. Nelson, 72 Cal. App. 2d 33,
163 P.2d 888 (1945).
71. The dissent of Mr. Justice Marshall McComb perhaps suggests that there was
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announcing "a better rule" than that stated in the statute, the court
failed to heed another established principle: "In construing the statu-
tory provisions a court is not authorized to insert qualifying pro-
visions not included and may not rewrite the statute to conform to an
assumed intention which does not appear from its language. The
court is limited to the intention expressed. 72
Faced with a novel procedure which struck at the traditional
roots of gamesmanship of the lawsuit, this appellate court sought to
limit section 437c, substituting, or perhaps confusing, the wide latitude
previously given the responding party in resisting a "speaking motion
to strike" for the statutory evidentiary requirement of section 437c.11
The ghost of McComsey still haunts some appellate and trial courts.
An analysis of supreme court cases, however, indicates that the evi-
dentiary requirements of the statute have not been abrogated, and
that these requirements apply equally to both the responding and
the moving affidavits.
Evidentiary Requirements Have Not Been
Abrogated by the Supreme Court
Referring to the evidentiary showing of the defendant, the supreme
court in Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Prentice74 stated:
As we have seen it is not necessary that the averments be
rigidly restricted to evidentiary matter. It may be that some of
the allegations or statements are somewhat in the nature of con-
clusions, but we are satisfied that facts within the knowledge of
the affiants and to which they are competent to testify, are set
forth with sufficient particularity, and from which it appears that
a bona fide defense to the action exists.
75
a great unwillingness to accept appellate department decisions as authoritative. Lasting
well into the 1950's, there was criticism, and often judicial resentment, that such
appellate departments constituted the court of last resort for the then vast municipal
court system. A former chief justice was insistent that their opinions not be published.
This led to the adoption of the procedure whereby the appellate departments could
certify unsettled questions of law to the courts of appeal, so that they might have the
first chance to set the precedent.
72. People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe, 36 Cal. 2d 471, 475, 224 P.2d 677,
680 (1950).
73. Upon motions for judgment on the pleadings, if the answer fairly construed
suggests that the defendant may have a good defense, a motion for judgment should
not be granted. Fabbro v. Dardi & Co., 93 Cal. App. 2d 247, 209 P.2d 91 (1949).
The court must treat the defendant's allegations as true, and must disregard plaintiff's
allegations, whether there is a direct and specific denial or indirect denial by affirma-
tive allegation of contrary facts. MacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal. 2d 809, 161 P.2d 449
(1945).
74. 19 Cal. 2d 553, 122 P.2d 264 (1942).
75. Id. at 561, 122 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added).
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A careful reading of the entire decision reveals that the case
does not hold that evidentiary facts are not required in a responding
affidavit. It does hold that, if that condition is met, the inclusion
of some conclusions of fact or of law do not vitiate the response.
In Coyne v Krempels,76 the court stated unequivocally that:
Summary judgment for plaintiff is proper only if the affidavits
in support of his motion state facts that, if proved, would be suffi-
cient to sustain judgment in his favor, and defendant does not "by
affidavit or affidavits show such facts as may be deemed
by the judge hearing the motion sufficient to present a triable
issue of fact."'77
In support the court cited section 437c and Gardenswartz v Equi-
table Life Assurance Society,78 rejected m McComsey v Leaf The
court added:
Since under that section [Cal. Code of Civ Proc. section 437c]
"an answer may be stricken out, even though a perfect defense
may be stated therein, unless the defendant by his affidavits shows
facts to substantiate the defense" a failure to file affidavits
showing such facts cannot be remedied by resort to the allega-
tions or demals of a verified answer. 79
To hold otherwise would render the summary judgment procedure
nugatory In this statement, Chief Justice Traynor cited as authority
Cowan Oil & Refining Co v Miley Petroleum Corp.,80 also dis-
approved of in McComsey
The declaration of Coyne was repeated in Stationers Corp v
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,81 but the court added:
The aim of the procedure is to discover, through the media of
affidavits, whether the parties possess evidence requiring the weigh-
mg procedures of a trial. In examining the sufficiency of affi-
davits filed in connection with the motion, the affidavits of the
moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent lib-
erally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the
motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the mo-
tion.8 2
Stationers Corp was a libel action in which summary judgment
had been granted to the defendant. The defendant had asserted
privilege for its publication of derogatory reports concerning plaintiff's
fiscal operations and management, claimed probable cause to be-
76. 36 Cal. 2d 257, 223 P.2d 244 (1950).
77 Id. at 261, 223 P.2d at 246 (emphasis added).
78. 23 Cal. App. 2d 745, 750-51, 68 P.2d 322, 325 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1937).
79. 36 Cal. 2d at 262-63, 223 P.2d at 247
80. 112 Cal. App. 773, 778, 295 P 504, 506 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931).
81. 62 Cal. 2d 412, 398 P.2d 785, 42 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1965).
82. Id. at 417, 398 P.2d at 788, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
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lieve that the statements furnished to it by certain credit managers
were true, and denied actual malice. But it appeared that the
defendant had refused to disclose the names of its informants to
plaintiffs. The supreme court determined that the defendant had
thus reduced its assertions of good faith and absence of malice to
an ipse dixit which was not probative and would not support the
proof of probable cause necessary to prevail on the motion. In fact,
the refusal to provide such information justified an inference in favor
of appellants that there was an absence of good faith, possibly
bearing upon the issue of lack of probable cause.
In Towne Development Co. v. Lee,83 the rule was repeated:
A summary judgment is proper only if (1) the affidavits in sup-
port of the moving party are sufficient, strictly construed, to
sustain a judgment m his favor and (2) the affidavits filed by the
opponent, liberally construed, do not show facts deemed by the
judge hearing the motion sufficient to present a triable issue.8 4
Such facts under section 437c must be those to which the affiant
can competently testify.
In Desny v. Wilder"8 the court stated:
[Tihe better rule is that the facts alleged in the affidavits of the
party against whom the motion is made must be accepted as
true, and that such affidavits to be sufficient need not necessarily
be composed wholly of strictly evidentiary facts."18 6
The first part of this rule presupposes that there are facts alleged in
the affidavits; the second indicates that the affidavits need not be
composed wholly of evidentiary facts. That is, there must be evi-
dentiary facts sufficient to controvert those properly stated in the
moving affidavits. Otherwise, what is the issue to be tried?
Statements of the general rules in other cases87 remain consis-
tent on evidentiary requirements. There is no indication that dicta
regarding liberal construction of an opposing party's proof is meant
to abrogate the long-established rule of Coyne.
Since the rights of both parties in a lawsuit are coequal, the
83. 63 Cal. 2d 147, 403 P.2d 724, 45 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1965).
84. Id. at 148, 403 P.2d at 725, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 317
85. 46 Cal. 2d 715, 725, 299 P.2d 257, 261 (1956). This was an unconscious
transfer of the rule applicable to motions for judgment on the pleadings. Cf. MacIsaac
v. Pozzo, 26 Cal. 2d 809, 161 P.2d 449 (1945).
86. 46 Cal. 2d at 725, 299 P.2d at 26.
87. Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co., 70 Cal. 2d 432, 450 P.2d 271,
74 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1969); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); R.D. Reeder Lathing Co. v. Allen, 66 Cal. 2d 373, 425 P.2d 785,
57 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1967).
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application of the evidentiary requirements, specified in Code of
Civil Procedure section 437c, to both the moving and the resisting
party is required by justice. The cases herem reviewed indicate that
the supreme court decisions have not departed from the statute. The
need for reaffirmation of the rule of Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v
Prentice"s arises because the court has denied rehearing to many
diverse and even opposing decisions of the appellate courts on the
point at issue. Despite the rule that denial of a hearing is not
necessarily equivalent to an affirmance, it is frequently so regarded.
It is hoped that the appellate courts will note and be guided by
the frequent citation of Snider v Snider 9 in recent decisions on the
supreme court. The doctrine of that case is clearly that the language
of section 437c applies to both parties. It holds that the test is
whether the affidavit sets forth facts with particularly, and within the
personal knowledge of the affiant. Liberal construction does not
negative the requirement that the evidence in the affidavits be compe-
tent.90
Intrinsic Issues Demanding Trial
Judge Zack accurately observed that confusion and uncertainty
in summary judgment law have been produced by the theory of some
decisions that there are some intrinsic issues of fact which preclude
application of the summary judgment procedure. 91 Cases and com-
mentators have at varying times proclaimed that negligence actions,
serious or complex questions of law or fact, matters involving credi-
bility of the affiants, and the interpretation of contracts cannot be
resolved by summary judgment.
While in certain situations there may be some basis for these
broad conclusions, such blanket pronouncements only serve to per-
petuate the confusion. An examination of the basic doctrines in-
volved and the questions arising on the motions can illuminate the
operation of the summary judgment procedure in these areas.
88. 19 Cal. 2d 553, 122 P.2d 264 (1942).
89. 200 Cal. App. 2d 741, 19 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1962).
90. Accord, Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 468-69, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 661, 663 (1963); Rodes v. Shannon, 194 Cal. App. 2d 743, 15 Cal. Rptr. 349
(1961); Estate of Kelly, 178 Cal. App. 2d 24, 2 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1960); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Fish, 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 362, 333 P.2d 133, 139 (1958); Schessler v. Keck,
138 Cal. App. 2d 663, 292 P.2d 314 (1956); see Craig v. Earl, 194 Cal. App. 2d 652,
15 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1961).




In addition to issues of fact concerning what the parties did
or did not do, negligence cases involve the standard of care required
of the reasonable man under the particular facts of the case. Deter-
mining this standard (where not a matter of law), and its application
to the conduct of the parties, is the function of the trier of fact.
Thus, it would appear that the existence of these triable issues in a
negligence case would preclude a full summary judgment.
Some negligence cases, however, do lend themselves to the pro-
cedure. 9 When the issue is the identity of the party to be charged,
summary judgment may be a proper method to secure dismissal by
reason of the facts93 or by reason of nonresponsibility under the
law.9 4  If the plaintiff's own evidence shows that he is chargeable
with contributory negligence or assumption of the risk as a matter
of law, his opponent may secure judgment. 95
In any negligence case where the facts are uncontested and only
issues of law relative to responsibility remain, the court may de-
cide the motion. 96  For example, in Premo v. Grigg,97 the court
stated that when the existence of duty rests upon the reasonable
foreseeability of harm, a jury question is presented unless reason-
able minds could not differ. But if the facts are clear, a matter of
law is presented. In Premo the court held that an intervening force
was a superseding cause of the wrongful death sued on.
On the other hand, in medical malpractice cases, where various
persons are responsible for different segments of service in diagnosis,
treatment and care of a patient, complex issues as to proximate cause
may arise. In this situation, there has been a reluctance to excul-
pate any single individual in the chain of interrelationships. 8
92. E.g., Premo v. Gngg, 237 Cal. App. 2d 192, 46 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1965);
Smith v. Southern Pac. Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d 728, 35 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1963).
93. Whitney's at the Beach v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 258, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 237 (1970).
94. See Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corp., 19 Cal. App. 3d 669, 96 Cal. Rptr.
803 (1971).
95. See Premo v. Grigg, 237 Cal. App. 2d 192, 46 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1965);
Smith v. Southern Pac. Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d 728, 35 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1963); cf.
Aguilera v. Atcheson, T. & S.F Ry., 188 Cal. App. 2d 274, 10 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1961)
(the rule on nonsuit).
96. See West v. Guy F. Atkinson Constr. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 296, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 286 (1967); Jones v. Forburger, 248 Cal. App. 2d 64, 56 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1967)
(defense affidavits sufficient); Tell v. Taylor, 191 Cal. App. 2d 266, 12 Cal. Rptr.
648 (1961) (malpractice actions barred by statute of limitation).
97. 237 Cal. App. 2d 192, 46 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1965).
98. See Wozniak v. Peninsula Hosp., 1 Cal. App. 3d 716, 82 Cal. Rptr. 84
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Thus, while the general rule remains that due care under the
circumstances is an intrinsic factual issue reserved for the trier of
fact, it should not be hastily concluded that the mere assertion of
negligence is sufficient to raise a triable issue.
Serious and Complex Questions
In McComsey v Leaf,99 the court sought, by way of dictum,
to limit the scope of the summary judgment procedure. Quoting
an out-of-state decision, the court made the unwarranted statement
that the summary judgment procedure was never intended to be used
in the determination of "serious questions." 100 The amendment to
section 437c, making it applicable to all actions and proceedings,
provides a partial answer to the charge that "serious questions" were
never to be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.10' But
if in fact a judge does have discretion to withhold summary judg-
ment because questions of law or fact are "serious," what is the
test? Every case is serious to its litigants.
Although the dictum of McComsey v Leaf has been repeated
and occasionally acted upon,10 2 it has never been sanctioned by the
supreme court in considering the appropriateness of the procedure in
cases involving "serious" legal questions. l'0 Nor does study of the
case law establish that there is any legal limitation on the power of
the courts to render summary judgment in cases involving complex
(1969); Latson v. Zeiler, 250 Cal. App. 2d 301, 58 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1967); Whaley v.
Fowler, 152 Cal. App. 2d 379, 313 P.2d 97 (1957).
99. 36 Cal. App. 2d 132, 97 P.2d 242 (1939).
100. "It never could have been, or in justice ought to have been the intention of
those who framed our Practice Act and rules thereunder that the decision of such a
serious question as this should be flung off on a motion for summary judgment."
Id. at 137, 97 P.2d at 245.
101. CAL. CODE CMy. PRoc. § 437c (West 1973).
102. E.g., Haumeder v. Lipsett, 90 Cal. App. 2d 167, 176, 202 P.2d 819, 824
(1949); Gibson v. De La Salle Institute, 66 Cal. App. 2d 609, 152 P.2d 774 (1944).
103. For example, in Simmons v. Civil Ser. Employees Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 381,
369 P.2d 262, 19 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1962), the plaintiff asserted and defendant denied
any express or implied representations that a judgment debtor was covered by public
liability insurance when he was not. The plaintiff claimed that he had relied on the
motor vehicle department records, and that defendant had breached a statutory duty to
advise the department of such noncoverage; that in reliance, he had sued and obtained
an uncollectible judgment, and was therefore damaged to the extent of his litigation
expenses. The court found it necessary to interpret the liability act, but then held that
the issues of reliance and damage required trial. See also Corwm v. Los Angeles News-
paper Serv. Bureau, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 842, 484 P.2d 953, 94 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1971)




factual issues. The decisions holding such cases for trial often ap-
pear to stem from the difficulty of establishing all the necessary
facts by affidavits, because of the magnitude of proof.104
Where the legal effects of extensive factual interrelationships
have to be assessed, based on considerable documentation, trial and
appellate courts have recoiled from the task of determining precise
triable issues. Consequently, they may hold that a determinative
issue is contigent upon factual determinations which cannot be made
upon the motion. Common examples are the issues of whether the
aggregate conduct of the parties evidences the formation of a con-
tract, 06 or whether there are factors which support the exercise of
the police power.' 06 Nevertheless, consideration of the cases in
which the summary judgment procedure has been employed °' shows
that serious and complex matters have been considered on motions
for summary judgment.10 8
The existence of issues may be so affected by interdependent
facts that the trial or reviewing court is reluctant to unscramble on
the basis of affidavits. When these facts are evaluated by a jury,
a general verdict may be reached without specification of the details
of proof, but upon trial by the court there must be findings of fact
and conclusions of law on every facet of the material issues. The
determination of whether there are triable issues of fact upon the
motion for summary judgment is no less demanding of the judge.
Hence, his inclination may be to hold the matter for trial.
Since all issues can be resolved at trial, there has been an
assumption that no harm is done if trial is required, even if ade-
quate analysis would show that a moving party is entitled to sum-
mary judgment or partial summary judgment. But justice delayed
is justice denied. Trial in such instances requires needless expendi-
ture of time and money by the litigant entitled to judgment and by
104. See, e.g., Haumeder v. Lipsett, 90 Cal. App. 2d 167, 202 P.2d 819 (1949).
105. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956); California Lettuce
Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 289 P.2d 785 (1955); Gibson v.
De La Salle Institute, 66 Cal. App. 2d 609, 152 P.2d 774 (1944).
106. G & D Holland Constr. Co. v. City of Marysville, 12 Cal. App. 3d 989,
91 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1970); Scruttan v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412,
79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
107. See cases cited note 10 supra.
108. E.g., Spencer v. Hibernia Bank, 186 Cal. App. 2d 702, 9 Cal. Rptr. 867
(1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 2 (1961) (suit alleging interest in a bank by success-
sors in interest of ancestors who claimed to have been members of the bank's predeces-
sor). See also cases cited notes 10 & 14 supra.
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the public which must underwrite the conduct of a trial. The judge
thus has an affirmative duty to decide the motion and to grant a
summary judgment if the moving party is entitled to it.109
Interpretation of Contracts
In contract actions, the primary judicial doctrine is that the
mutual intention of the parties as to be given effect. The written con-
tract formalizes the expression of that intention; at provides the work-
ing basis for the relationship of the parties; it also inhibits any attempted
equivocation or repudiation of the contract obligations.
A dispute over the existence or meaning of a contract involves
questions both of fact and of law But the duty of determining the
legal effect of a written instrument is cast in the first instance upon
the trial court. 110 Thus, if the court determines that the instruments
before it do not form a valid contract, the motion for summary judgment
may be disposed of as a matter of law For example, the question of
whether two letters constituted an agreement for sale has been held
to be a matter of law, not of fact."' Similarly, summary judgments
have been upheld on appeal where the trial court was required to
determine whether a life insurance contract was in effect at the time
of death" 2 or whether there existed a contract to create a trust." 3
In addition, if the contract sued upon is illegal, the court may give
summary judgment for the defendant as a matter of law ".
109. Bank of America v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. 3d 435, 84 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1970); see Burke Concrete Accessories, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 773,
87 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1970), in which both parties moved for summary judgment, and
both motions were demed. Under a writ of mandate, the cause was remanded with
instructions to decide for one or the other.
110. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal.
2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968). Ajax Holding Co. v. Heinsbergen,
64 Cal. App. 2d 665, 670, 149 P.2d 189, 192 (1944).
111. See Thomson v. Honer, 179 Cal. App. 2d 197, 3 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1960);
Ajax Holding Co. v. Heinsbergen, 64 Cal. App. 2d 665, 149 P.2d 189 (1944). For
other examples see Elliott v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 510, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 525 (1964) (application of "clerical error" clause in policy of group insurance as
affecting failure to list plaintiff employee's name); Boughton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,
231 Cal. App. 2d 188, 41 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1956) (enforceability of prohibition of use of
premises for oil station as provided in lease).
112. Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co., 70 Cal. 2d 432, 450 P.2d 271,
74 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1969).
113. Snider v. Snider, 200 Cal. App. 2d 741, 19 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1962).
114. See Brewer v. Home Owners Auto Fin. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 337, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 231 (1970); Lee v. Marchetti, 4 Cal. App. 3d 97, 84 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1970);
Beach v. Arblaster, 194 Cal. App. 2d 145, 14 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1961); Braverman v.
Horn, 88 Cal. App. 2d 379, 198 P.2d 948 (1948); Rose v. Nelson, 79 Cal. App. 2d
751, 180 P.2d 749 (1947).
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The question of whether or not a valid contract exists may
also present issues of fact. For example, situations where a contract
is attacked for failure of consideration, or where a contract was
allegedly induced by fraud, involve questions of law and of fact.
Even claims such as these must be supported by competent affi-
davits. If the evidentiary support is not offered, the court may
properly enter summary judgment on the contract.' 15
The greatest difficulties arise where there is a dispute as to the
terms of a contract. One starts with the proposition that where there
is no conflict over the terms of a contract and where there is no
ambiguity as to meaning, the effect of the contract is a matter of
law for the court to decide." 8  By way of contrast, where the con-
tractual relations of the parties have been established by a long
course of dealing between them, the terms of the contract can only
be established by trial"'17 In any event, where the terms of the
contract are not m dispute an the parties have stipulated to the
115. Jones v. Dolgin, 220 Cal. App. 2d 27, 33 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1963).
116. See Wilson v. Wilson, 54 Cal. 2d 264, 352 P.2d 725, 5 Cal. Rptr. 317
(1960) (construction of property settlement agreement); Gardner v. Jonathan Club, 35
Cal. 2d 343, 217 P.2d 961 (1950) (innkeeper's liability); National Exhibition Co. v.
City & County of San Francisco, 24 Cal. App. 3d 1, 100 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1972) (taxa-
tion of admission tickets); Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d 226, 96
Cal. Rptr. 118 (1971) (no unfair competition in use of song title "Love Bug"); Rafeiro
v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 5 Cal. App. 3d 799, 805, 85 Cal. Rptr. 701, 705-06
(1970) (coverage of insurance policy); Weiss v. Brentwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 4
Cal. App. 3d 738, 84 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1970) (construction of subordination agree-
ment); Bank of America v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. 3d 435, 84 Cal. Rptr. 421
(1970) (note enforced according to its terms); Sunbeam Constr. Co. v. Fisci, 2 Cal.
App. 3d 181, 82 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1969) (claim of implied warranty m building);
Matthews v. Hinton, 234 Cal. App. 2d 736, 44 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1965) (liability status
of parties signing trust deed as trustors); Sinks v. Merrill, 222 Cal. App. 2d 200, 35
Cal. Rptr. 113 (1963) (no contract, no triable issue); Sporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal.
App. 2d 463, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1963) (action for rescission of contract); Doyle v.
Hibernia Bank, 156 Cal. App. 2d 16, 319 P.2d 412 (1957); Enos v. Foster, 155 Cal.
App. 2d 152, 157, 317 P.2d 670, 673 (1957); Dorsey v. City of Los Angeles, 132
Cal. App. 2d 716, 282 P.2d 997 (1955) (exemption of personnel from civil service);
Reiner v. Hermann, 79 Cal. App. 2d 543, 180 P.2d 385 (1947) (specific performance
of land sale contract); Bromberg v. Bank of America, 58 Cal. App. 2d 1, 135
P.2d 689 (1943) (bank's right of setoff for overdraft); cf. Dahew v. Dashew Bus.
Machs., 218 Cal. App. 2d 711, 32 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1963) (alter ego not established);
Green v. Green, 215 Cal. App. 2d 37, 30 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1963) (unavailing attack on
foreign divorce decree); Meyer Koulish Co. v. Cannon, 213 Cal. App. 2d 419, 432-33,
28 Cal. Rptr. 757, 765 (1963) (sale of merchandise, damages fixed by pretrial order
and hence not m issue); American Cas. Co. v. Curran Prods., Inc., 212 Cal. App. 2d
386, 28 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1963) (sale within Statute of Frauds); Shearer v. United Cal.
Theatres, 133 Cal. App. 2d 720, 284 P.2d 934 (1955) (indemnification claimed, nega-
tived by contract itself).
117. California Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co., 45 Cal. 2d 474, 289 P.2d
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applicable facts, the court has an absolute duty to grant a summary
judgment.118
In Masterson v Sine," 9 Chief Justice Traynor states the rule
that when the parties have agreed to a written contract as the com-
plete and final embodiment of the terms of the agreement, parol evi-
dence cannot be used to add to or vary its terms. When only part
of the agreement is so integrated, the rule applies to that part, but
parol evidence is admissible to establish the terms of the balance of
the contract. Thus, the crucial issue is whether, as a matter of law,
there has been such integration, that is, whether the parties intended
the document to be the exclusive embodiment of their agreement.'2
By the declarations contained therein, the document itself may help
to resolve these questions.'
If there is a collateral oral agreement, not required to be in
writing to comply with the Statute of Frauds, it cannot be said that
the contract is integrated.'2 2  However, since the written contract
supersedes prior negotiations, evidence of the prior negotiations may
not be used to contradict the written instrument. 123  Thus, in the
absence of fraud or imposition, a party is bound by the instrument
he signs.' Parol evidence is not admissible to show the parties
meant something different. In the event there is an ambiguity of
meaning, however, parol evidence is admissible.
A careful analysis of the appellate decisions leads one to reject
the premise that the power to grant summary judgment in contract
interpretation cases is precluded on the assumption that intrinsic issues
of fact always exist. For example, in Walsh v Walsh, 2 5 a property
settlement agreement provided for support of the "child or children" of
the parties. An adopted son who had reached his majority sued for
785 (1955); Gibson v. De La Salle Institute, 66 Cal. App. 2d 609, 152 P.2d 774
(1944), cf. Malone v. Jones, 208 Cal. App. 2d 343, 25 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1962).
118. Burke Concrete Accessories, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d 773, 87
Cal. Rptr. 619 (1970).
119. 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
120. Larsen v. Johannes, 7 Cal. App. 3d 491, 506, 86 Cal. Rptr. 744, 753 (1970).
121. See Larsen v. Johannes, 7 Cal. App. 3d 491, 86 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1970).
122. Kett v. Graeser, 241 Cal. App. 2d 571, 50 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1966).
123. Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Remler Co., 179 Cal. App. 2d 700, 4 Cal. Rptr. 103
(1960).
124. Larsen v. Johannes, 7 Cal. App. 3d 491, 501, 86 Cal. Rptr. 744, 749 (1970);
cf. Raden v. Laurie, 120 Cal. App. 2d 778, 262 P.2d 61 (1953) (attempt to convert
contract to purpose negatived by its express terms).
125. 18 Cal. 2d 439, 116 P.2d 62 (1941).
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continuance of support. Upon a motion for summary judgment, it
was held that an issue was raised as to whether the words "child or
children" limited payments under the agreement to the minority of
the beneficiary or whether they were words of description which
merely identified the beneficiary. It was held that the parties should
have a full opportunity upon trial to show by parol the meaning in-
tended. In reaching this decision, the supreme court stated:
Thus, m passing upon a motion for summary judgment, the pri-
mary duty of the trial court is to decide whether there is an issue
of fact to be tried. If it finds one, it is then powerless to pro-
ceed further, but must allow such issue to be tried by a jury un-
less a jury trial is waived. 126
Under the facts of the case, the phrase "powerless to proceed" rested
upon the tendering of opposing interpretations of the language in
question. Contrary to Judge Zack's position, it is not here concluded
that summary judgment is prohibited to a party who by affidavit of-
fers evidence to resolve the ambiguity, where the opponent takes no
issue with the interpretation or offers none on his behalf. 12 7  Thus,
in Wilson v Wilson,'28 the defendant moved for summary judgment.
Plaintiff likewise moved for summary judgment and tendered a con-
struction of the property settlement agreement which was not con-
troverted. While the court indicated that counsel had agreed during
oral argument that there was no material issue of fact, there is
no hint that the issue as to consideration ipso facto required trial.
The court held as a matter of law that the legal obligation for the
support of minors provided the consideration and affirmed a sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiff.
Likewise, in Hardy v. Hardy,2 9 the issue also was the proper
construction of a property settlement agreement. It was stipulated
that if the defendant's interpretation of the terms of the agreement was
correct, summary judgment should be granted to him. The defendant
set forth pertinent provisions of the agreement in his affidavit and
averred that the explicit terms of the agreement set forth the intention
of the parties. The plaintiff's affidavit referred to a deposition to
establish the circumstances concerning the agreement and offered a
construction of the agreement, which if adopted, would have made 'it
void for uncertainty. Despite this attempt to raise a triable issue, the
court found the terms of the agreement to be explicit and upheld it.
126. Id. at 441, 116 P.2d at 64.
127. Zack, supra note 7, at 455.
128. 54 Cal. 2d 264, 352 P.2d 725, 5 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1960).
129. 23 Cal. 2d 244, 143 P.2d 701 (1943).
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Thus, the mere existence of a conflict in the interpretation of a con-
tract does not ipso facto leave the court "powerless to proceed."
Since the trial court has the duty of interpreting a contract,
this inspection alone may indicate important ambiguities that must be
resolved before judgment can be given. 130  The parties themselves
may not have perceived the lacunae at the time of the hearing on the
motion and may not have covered the matter in their affidavits. Fur-
thermore, where the trial court makes an interpretation as a matter of
law, the appellate court asserts the right to make an independent con-
struction.' Thus, there are instances in which the appellate court,
in reversing a summary judgment, has postulated factual issues which
have passed unperceived by the litigants and the trial court.132
For example, in Crescenta Valley Moose Lodge No. 808 v
Bunt, 3 3 a suit was brought for specific performance of a contract
to purchase realty The deposit receipt relied upon made the trans-
action "subject to approval of all other licensing agencies." The sum-
mary judgment was reversed, since this phrase was ambiguous, both
as to the identity of the agencies, and as to the party for whose bene-
fit the clause was inserted.
In Blaustein v Burton, 34 the Richard Burtons were sued by a
producer for breach of contract. The producer claimed a right to
compensation for use of his idea in the Burton's production of The
Taming of the Shrew 131 Upon defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, both parties filed depositions and affidavits. The summary
judgment for defendants was reversed on appeal; the court held that
there was a triable dispute as to the contract, and since both of the
opposing interpretations were reasonable, trial was required. Like-
wise, there was a dispute as to whether the "idea" had been disclosed
130. See D.E. Sanford Co. v. Cory Glass Coffee Brewer Co., 85 Cal. App. 2d
724, 194 P.2d 127 (1948), wherein the court delineated the issues that had to be met,
and held that they had not been.
131. E.g., Norlen Inv. Co. v. Minskoff, 251 Cal. App. 2d 534, 59 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1967).
132. Silver Land & Dev. Co. v. California Land Title Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 241,
56 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1967).
133. 8 Cal. App. 3d 682, 87 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1970). Other cases of ambiguity in-
clude County of Los Angeles v. Stone, 198 Cal. App. 2d 640, 18 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1961)
(right of lessee to share in eminent domain award); Travelers Indem. Co. v. McIntosh,
112 Cal. App. 2d 177, 245 P.2d 1065 (1952) (funds subject to assignment).
134. 9 Cal. App. 3d 161, 88 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970).
135. Cf. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 749, 299 P.2d 257, 277 (1956) (a
factual issue, rather than one of law, was presented as to whether defendants used
plaintiff's story synopsis, or developed one of their own independently).
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in confidence, which also presented a triable issue. One commenta-
tor 38 maintained that the court did not determine whether there was a
triable issue on the affidavits, but held instead that a parol evidence
issue is not properly considered upon a motion for summary judg-
ment. This contention is rebutted by a careful reading of the decision
itself.
In construing contracts or other documents and in considering
the evidentiary matters submitted upon a motion for summary judg-
ment, trial judges have been rebuked for apparently trying the facts,
rather than making the sole determination of whether there are issues
upon which the conflicting evidentiary assertions must be tried.117
However, some appellate court decisions appear to reflect the same
vice.1s 8
It is to be expected that when one of the litigants claims an
ambiguity, he will bring it to the attention of the court with an appro-
priate affidavit. When the court discovers a possibile ambiguity which
has not been asserted by a party, the matter should be continued to
permit the parties to assert their understanding. What is unclear to
the court may be perfectly clear to the parties, and the further affi-
davits may disclose no controversy and hence no triable issue.
One party's unilateral declaration that there is a material am-
biguity does not determine the matter. The court must find that the
language in question reasonably permits the interpretation claimed to
have been the mutual intention of the parties. In any case, one must
reject the premise that in the interpretation of contracts, intrinsic issues
of fact exist which in all cases negative the power to grant a summary
judgment.
Evidence in Control of the Adverse Party
The problems arising when an opposing party is unable to make
136. Zack, supra note 7, at 455.
137. E.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal. 2d 439, 444, 116 P.2d 62, 65 (1941); Silver
Land & Dev. Co. v. California Land Title Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 241, 56 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1967); Gardner v. Shreve, 89 Cal. App. 2d 804, 202 P.2d 322 (1949).
138. In Glasband v. Sun State Music Dist., Inc., 265 Cal. App. 2d 413, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1968), the court sent the cause back, with the remark that it did not know
what the true facts were. The same approach is indicated m Barnes v. Blue Haven
Pools, 1 Cal. App. 3d 123, 81 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1969). The court sent back the cause,
stating that on the basis presented the court was "none the wiser" whether the pool
was negligent constructed or not. The court apparently reviewed the evidence,
rather than simply making a searh for issues.
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a showing were anticipated by the court in Gardenswartz v Equitable
Life Assurance Society"'39
[T]here might be cases where the court, in the exercise of its dis-
cretion, should deny a motion for summary judgment even though
the defendant was unable to make a showing as the statute re-
quires. Such a case might be where the facts of the defense were
not within the defendant's knowledge and other persons who knew
or claimed to know refused to make affidavits to be used in oppo-
sition to the motion.140
Where there are two parties to a transaction, it may be assumed
that each has equal knowledge of the facts and can fully respond to
the contentions of the other. Is a motion for summary judgment to be
denied if there are facts presented by the one party which the other
cannot intrinsically controvert? Is there any assurance that upon trial
he would have any more or different evidence on the issue?' 4
The recent case of Freidberg v Freidberg'42 grappled with this
problem. In an action to set aside a property settlement agreement on
the ground that the husband had failed to make full disclosure of
community assets, the wife contended that due to her mental state of
complete dependence upon what her husband told her, she had been
induced to execute the agreement. Perhaps the dependence could
have been controverted by affidavits concerning specific events or
courses of conduct, but the court concluded that there could be no
summary judgment as to her mental state, since it was entirely locked
within her consciousness.
The suggestion conveyed in Gardenswartz justifies this position;
when the cause moves into an area for which the code section makes
no express provision, the discretion of the court is properly exercised
in sending the case on for trial. Further support is found in the Code
of Civil Procedure section 187 1-3 Where the code does not point
the way, a court may adopt any suitable procedure or mode of proceed-
ing most conformable to the code.'4 4
On the other hand, in a declaratory relief action filed by a trustee
in bankruptcy, the trustee asserted the invalidity of a homestead filed
139. 23 Cal. App. 2d 745, 62 P.2d 322 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1937).
140. Id. at 750, 62 P.2d at 325; accord, Cowan Oil & Ref. Co. v. Miley, Pet-
roleum Corp., 112 Cal. App. 773, 780-81, 295 P 504, 507 (App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1931).
141. Cf. Schessler v. Keck, 138 Cal. App. 2d 663, 292 P.2d 314 (1956).
142. 9 Cal. App. 3d 754, 88 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1970).
143. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 187 (West 1954).
144. Cf. Ligda v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 811, 826, 85 Cal. Rptr. 744,
753 (1970).
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by a wife. Each party filed a motion for summary judgment. The
trustee claimed that the wife did not reside in, nor did she occupy,
the premises at the time of filing. The wife alleged details of a domes-
tic situation, claiming that she had left home temporarily to protect
herself and her children, and that she had returned pursuant to an order
to show cause. The trustee contended that he had no personal knowl-
edge of the details of the domestic life of the wife, and that, based on
his want of information or belief, he was unable to make a response.
This was held to be insufficient, as the trustee had made no showing of
his inability to obtain the information. The trustee had failed to show
why the husband's affidavit could not have been secured.' 45
The court in Southern Pacific Co. v Fish'46 stated that a party
without personal knowledge of the facts should at least present an
affidavit by someone who knows the facts of his own knowledge.
Failing that, he should name such other persons who know or claim
to know facts and who refuse to make affidavits, and set forth what
each one knows or claims to know.
Is Trial Necessary to Test Credibility?
Another special case was considered m Harding v. Purtle.147
In a three car collision plaintiff Harding, driving the first car, was hit
from behind by Purtle, who was hit by McDougal. In the trial court
Purtle secured a summary judgment against Harding. The appellate
court reversed. Based on the depositions of both parties, the court
indicated that there was a triable issue, that is, whether Purtle had
followed too closely. As previously indicated the evaluation of con-
duct in relation to the exercise of due care always involves a triable
issue; the trier of fact determining the standard of care applicable to
the circumstances.
Unfortunately, the court in this case went further. It indicated
that the issue of due care might depend on a factual issue of which
Purtle was the only witness. He was the only one who knew whether
in the impact his foot slipped from the clutch or he took it away.
Therefore, the court said, the case should be tried so that upon cross-
examination hIs credibility might be tested. No one had questioned
145. Michelman v. Frye, 238 Cal. App. 2d 698, 48 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1965).
146. 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 366, 333 P.2d 133, 141 (1958).
147. 275 Cal. App. 2d 396, 79 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1969); cf. Kramer v. Barnes,
212 Cal. App. 2d 440, 27 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1963) (court indicated that such cases involve
questions of fact and outlined them).
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his credibility in relation to the motion; but with a citation to Professor
Bauman 4 s the issue was thrust into the decision.
Barring the improbable,' 49 the court hearing the motion has
nothing to do with credibility under the- accepted doctrines. 15° If one
assumes that the moving party has established every element by his
prima facie proof, does the discretion of the court m passing on the
motion nevertheless extend to holding the case for trial, because on
trial, through cross-examination or otherwise, the witness or testi-
mony on material issues might be deemed incredible?
Repeatedly the courts have stated the rule, as in Kelly v Liddi-
coat:'5'
[A]ppellants do not challenge the sufficiency of the respondent's
showing, on the motion. Their failure to file affidavits or other-
wise oppose the motion indicates that they were entirely un-
able to make the showing of a substantial and meritorious de-
fense as required by section 437c, and this language found in
Bank of America etc. Assn. v Oil Well Supply Co., 12 Cal. App.
(2d) 265, 270 [55 P.2d 885], seems to be particularly appli-
cable to this case: "It was the defendant's privilege, under section
437c of the Code of Civil Procedure to set forth the claim, by
proper averments, that there was available at least the semblance
of a defense; having failed to do this the trial court justly con-
cluded that there was no defense to the action.' 1 52
This rule has not always been strictly followed. An attempted
distinction has been made on the basis that in the cases following the
rule the opponents of the motion had parity of knowledge.' 53 This
distinction has not provided a meamngful test. Summary judgment
has been granted even though the responding party was in a position
where he could not establish his cause or defense because factual knowl-
edge was not available to him. 54 The rationale may well be that if
148. Bauman, supra note 6, at 351.
149 Such improbability was determined as a matter of law in Schoener v. Walt-
man, 125 Cal. App. 2d 182, 270 P.2d 543 (1954); see Frye v. Felder, 246 Cal. App.
136, 54 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1966).
150. Cf. Garlock v. Cole, 199 Cal. App. 2d 11, 14, 18 Cal. Rptr. 393, 395 (1962).
151. 35 Cal. App. 2d 559, 96 P.2d 186 (1939).
152. Id. at 565, 96 P.2d at 190; see, e.g., Seltzer v. Seltzer, 276 Cal. App. 2d 137,
80 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1969); cf. Pickens v. American Mortgage Exch., 269 Cal. App. 2d
299, 304, 74 Cal. Rptr. 788, 792 (1969); Hayward Tamkin & Co. v. Carpentena Inv.
Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 617, 622, 71 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465 (1968).
153. Frye v. Felder, 246 Cal. App. 2d 136, 139, 54 Cal. Rptr. 627, 630 (1966).
154. See Schessler v. Keck, 138 Cal. App. 2d 663, 292 P.2d 314 (1956). As
against defendant's motion, supported by detailed affidavits concerning all dealings with
alleged co-conspirators, plaintiff's general charges of conspiracy to slander were held
insufficient. The court observed that from plaintiff's affidavits and briefs, she could
not competently testify to the constituent facts because she did not know them. There
was no showing they existed at all.
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a respondent cannot muster the facts to resist the motion he would not
be able to do any better upon trial.'55 In any event, the difficulty of
getting evidence from one's adversaries is not now a matter of serious
excuse since various discovery methods are available. 156 The logical
view is developing that since discovery is available, the claim that
facts are solely in the possession of the adverse party is not a ground
for denying summary judgment, particularly where there is no show-
ing of an attempt to procure them. 57
The court in Buffalo Arns, Inc. v. Remler Company5 s stated
that section 437c of the Code of Civil Procedure antedated discovery
procedures by twenty-five years. Thus, discovery should make the
summary judgment procedure more useful than it had been. When
discovery makes it perfectly plain that there is no substantial issue
to be tried, the summary judgment is available for the prompt dis-
position of the case. If a motion for summary judgment is denied on
the ground that discovery is not complete, this denial does not bar
a subsequent motion.' 59
Some unfounded conclusions apparently may be drawn from
Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 0° where the facts were in
the control of an adverse party. The defendants were sued for libel
per se because of credit reports concerning the plaintiff. The falsity
of the reports was established by the affidavits before the court. The
issue centered upon the defendants' claim of privilege, based upon
probable cause to believe the truth of the reports and the absence of
malice. The defendants' information had come from four credit
managers. Plaintiff sought their names by discovery but these were
refused by the defendants. By withholding this evidence, the defend-
155. In Estate of Niquette, 264 Cal. App. 2d 976, 71 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1968), the
plaintiff's affidavits showed no facts which he knew to establish undue influence in the
execution of a will, aside from opportunity, and indicated he didn't know anyone who
did. Dismissal of this action by summary judgment was proper.
156. CAL. CODE CWv. PROC. §§ 2016, 2030-34, 2036 (West Supp. 1973) (deposi-
tions, written interrogatories and requests for admissions). In Bank of America v.
Oil Well Supply Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 265, 270, 55 P.2d 885, 888 (1936), an action
was brought on a guaranty of a note for the prncipal amount less the payments made.
The defendant said the only way they could determine the amount due was from plain-
tiff's books. The court disregarded this, since it was not shown there had been any
request for a continuance to get the inspection.
157. See Nizuk v. Gorges, 180 Cal. App. 2d 699, 710, 4 Cal. Rptr. 565, 573
(1960).
158. 179 Cal. App. 2d 700, 4 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1960).
159. See Aguirre v. Southern Pac. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 636, 649-50, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 73, 82 (1965).
160. 62 Cal. 2d 412, 398 P.2d 785, 42 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1965).
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ants did not carry the burden of showing probable cause and absence
of malice upon the motion, and a summary judgment in their favor
was reversed. 16'
This case does not hold that summary judgment is improper
where the material evidence is in the control of the adverse party.
Without revealing the names, the statement of Dun & Bradstreet that
"some persons told us" was hearsay m the first instance. Although
it would still have been hearsay if the names had been revealed, the
witnesses perhaps could have been produced. To defend the suit the
defendants necessarily would have had to reveal the sources of their
information. Choosing not to reveal the names to protect their sources
of credit information, there was no defense and they were liable in
damages. Such conduct was a calculated risk.
In Frye v Felder'62 the issue stated by the court was
[w]hether a trial court should grant a motion for summary
judgment on the basis of facts alleged in plaintiff's uncontradicted
declaration, which facts the defendant is in no position to deny,
but where the plaintiff's own declaration raises a grave question
concerning his credibility 163
The court answered this question in the negative. The credibility issue
was brought into the case by the appellate court. However synthetic
the credibility issue may have been on the facts, the question still
exists as to what a trial court should do when the moving party's
uncontradicted affidavits entitle him to judgment, but the lack of con-
tradiction is due to the inability of the resisting party to contest them.
Is he going to be any better off when the cause comes to trial? It
is presumed that if he has facts to contest the moving party's assertions,
he will, and must, assert them.1 64
Admittedly, the ratio decidendi of Frye v Felder is that the trial
judge should deny the motion and hold the case for trial any time a
question of credibility is raised. But if that is the rationale, it is sub-
mitted that no test for deternimmg what is to be deemed an incredible
or questionable affidavit can be devised. Repeatedly the courts have
refused to consider questions of credibility on the hearing of a motion
161. Cf. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 2034 (West Supp. 1973) (effect of refusal to
make discovery).
162. 246 Cal. App. 2d 136, 54 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1966).
163. Id. at 136, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
164. Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Fish, 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 333 P.2d 133 (1958)
(where movant's affidavit was made upon information and belief, it was insufficient to
support summary judgment, even though the facts were m the hands of the adverse
party).
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for summary judgment, unless demonstrably outrageous sham is evi-
dent.105
In a suit for libel, Swope v. Moskovitz,o6 defendant moved for
summary judgment. The plaintiff averred he had no personal knowl-
edge of the statements but identified the informants. The defendant
then presented affidavits of the informants testifying that they had not
made the statements. Plaintiff responded, unavailingly, that he be-
lieved the statements were made. Summary judgment was granted.
Similarly, affidavits averring an inability to rebut due to a lack of know-
ledge have been ineffective to raise triable issues.' 67
When the appellate court decides to give the losing party another
chance 0 8 by determining that a question of credibility is involved,
one can expect that on remand the one in whose favor the issue was
raised is likely to make full use of it by saying to the jury, "The appel-
late court said it doubted the truth of Mr. Jones's testimony, and so
may you, ladies and gentlemen."
In order to avoid such implications upon retrial, one court added
to its decision, reversing a summary judgment:
In consideration of this case, we have been limited to an inquiry
whether the ultimate facts which might be found from the allega-
tions of the affidavits show the existence of any triable issue. The
evidence adduced at the trial may support none of the possible
165. In Stirton v. Pastor, 177 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234, 2 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136 (1960),
the court stated that whether the allegations were true or made in good faith was not
a matter for the court. But in Schoener v. Waltman, 125 Cal. App. 2d 182, 270 P.2d
543 (1954), involving a claim of homestead, the court said: "The second point rests on
the contention that the trial court should have assumed that defendant and his former
wife were actually living on the premises as husband and wife 10 days after they had
been divorced, and the wife was then the spouse of another. The facts upon whch this
amazing contention is based on are 'such stuff as dreams are made on' and too un-
realistic to constitute a controversy between fact and fiction." Id. at 183, 270 P.2d at
544. In Boscus v. Bohlig, 173 Cal. 687, 162 P 100 (1916), a traverse to a money
claim for work was made, declaring on information and belief that the work was of
no value. The court stated that this "is so paltry as to amount to nothing at all." Id.
at 689, 162 P at 101-02. The demal upon information and belief "of certain matters
whteh must have been within the knowledge of the defendants is an indulgence 'in
playful frivolity not consistent with the solemnity of sworn pleadings in a court of
justice." Id. The court stated further that a positive demal is necessary where the
pleader has knowledge or means of acquiring knowledge, which might enable him to
traverse or admit the facts alleged, or show how it happens he is destitute of knowl-
edge concerning such facts. Id.
166. 253 Cal. App. 2d 514, 61 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1967).
167. Michelman v. Frye, 238 Cal. App. 2d 698, 48 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1965).
168. No "other chance" is afforded if not requested in the trial court. Hayward
Union High School Dist. v. Madrid, 234 Cal. App. 2d 100, 128, 44 Cal. Rptr. 268, 286
(1965).
November 1973] SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
fact conclusions suggested m this opinion, or may warrant findings
not suggested here. Our decision in no way limits the trier of
the facts, but merely determines that the case cannot be disposed
of on a motion for summary judgment.' 69
In Reida v Lund1 70 the court stated that cases may arise where
knowledge of events is so confined in the bosom of a declarant that
proof to controvert it is difficult to come by and of necessity is ex-
cused. But this rule was held mapplicable to that case where the
party asserting presumptive knowledge of a person's mental state and
propensities could have secured the names of available witnesses.
The rulings in the Harding and Frye cases were paraded before
the court in Jordan v Canale Foods, Inc.'1" The plaintiff had alleged
that the defendant was a member of a joint venture which owned or
operated a truck which struck him. The defendant showed by com-
petent, detailed affidavits that it had no relationship either to the own-
er or the operator of the truck. The plaintiff contended that critical
facts only known to the defendant were in issue, and that therefore
the case should have been sent to trial. The court, with the affida-
vits and depositions before it, held that there was no special question
of credibility except self-interest, which is always involved. Signifi-
cantly, it held that there was no showing in the counteraffidavits
that the plaintiff could prevail at trial by attacking credibility or other
means. Since the statutory requirements were met, the defendant's
motion for summary judgment was held to have been properly grant-
ed.
Professor Bauman concluded in his article on summary judgment
in California that unresolved credibility issues are inherent in the
summary judgment procedure. 72  He questioned whether the test
should be less demanding than that applied to similar uncontested
evidence on a motion for a directed verdict. "Thus to direct a
verdict for the plaintiff requires that the court favorably resolve the
issues of credibility inherent in his testimonial proof."' 7 3  This faulty
analogy seems to infect the approach and the conclusions advanced.
In Califorma law the judge, in directing a verdict, does not "resolve
169. Dudum v. City of San Mateo, 167 Cal. App. 2d 593, 598, 334 P.2d 968,
971-72 (1959); accord, Roth v. Guardian Thrift & Loan, 162 Cal. App. 2d 320, 327
P.2d 945 (1958).
170. 18 Cal. App. 3d 698, 96 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1971).
171. 15 Cal. App. 3d 634, 93 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1971).
172. Bauman, supra note 6, at 367
173. Id. at 349.
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the issues of credibility" inherent in the testimonial proof. 7 4 As in
failing to deny the allegations of a complaint, the well-pleaded allega-
tions are admitted, and the defendant who presents no evidence ad-
mits the truth of the plaintiff's evidence. When that evidence covers
the necessary elements of the cause, the plaintiff is entitled to judg-
ment.
Professor Bauman finds that a number of summary judgments
may be based upon undisputed documented evidence, because the
courts "willingly accept as true undisputed documentary evidence. 175
This does not, however, indicate that the court makes a determination
of credibility, since in most instances the substantive law makes those
determinations for all parties.1 76
Bauman's summation was:
"The conclusion derived from this review of the cases is that
the determination of the credibility of the supporting proof is the
major problem facing a court in the disposition of a motion by
a plaintiff for summary judgment .... The more highly valued
the proof of the plaintiff, the greater the burden is imposed on
the defendant to produce evidence showing that a genuine issue
of fact exists."'177
This conclusion does not withstand close scrutiny. The host of
the cases demonstrates that the courts are concerned with issue deter-
mination. The credibility or evidence is not weighed; instead its
competency is considered. If prima facie competent evidence on the
one side vis A vis prima facie competent evidence asserted by the other
is in conflict on material issues, that conflict is reserved for the trier
of fact to determine.
Professor Bauman suggested that there are many cases where
knowledge of the facts "is fortuitous and not shared, and where the
absence of controverting proof could not reasonably be the basis for
an inference that the plaintiff's version of the occurrence is a true
one.' 78  He continues, "thus, to avoid incorrect decisions, the ac-
ceptance of the truthfulness of the supporting proof must be re-
stricted to cases in which courts are willing to resolve credibility issues
as a matter of law.'1 79 Quite to the contrary, it must be noted again
174. Gish v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 13 Cal. 2d 570, 573, 90 P.2d 792, 794 (1939)
(no power to weigh the evidence on a motion for directed verdict).
175. Bauman, supra note 6, at 351.
176. See, e.g., CAL. EVED. CODE § 664 (West 1966) (official duty regularly
performed); id. § 1532 (official record of recorded writing).
177. Bauman, supra note 6, at 355.
178. Id. at 356.
179. Id. at 359.
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that as a matter of law the court must give full effect to the uncontra-
dicted affidavits.'8 0
Bauman overlooks the settled proposition that a witness is pre-
sumed to speak the truth. The testimony by affidavit is given under
oath or under the penalties for perjury Under California Penal
Code section 118a,' 8 ' one who makes an affidavit that he will testify
before any competent tribunal "in any particular manner, or to any
particular fact, and in such affidavit willfully and contrary to such
oath states as true any material matter which he knows to be false,
is guilty of perjury "182 His subsequent testimony "in any action in-
volving the matters in such affidavit contained, which is contrary to
any of the matters in such affidavit contained, shall be prima facie
evidence that the matters in such affidavit were false.' 118 3
Finally, Bauman contends that the acceptance of the truthfulness
of supporting documents must be restricted to cases where credibility
is a matter of law, such as those involving affidavits of public officials
or public documents.' 4 Examination of the cases shows that in
many instances the actual basis of decision rests upon the fact that
the public officers concerned, acting within their legal discretion,
were protected from suit for the results of such discretionary acts.'
Such suits often involve statutory construction, as in quo warranto
where, for instance, the object is to test the validity of an annexation.
Upon summary judgment the facts may be presented by affidavit,
but the issue may hinge solely upon construction of the statute to
be applied.
Should the inability to respond impede the summary judgment pro-
cedure? Upon trial it frequently happens that a party is not able to con-
trovert the evidence against him. Nevertheless, he still is bound ac-
cordingly The same condition attaches to the motion for summary
180. Taliaferro v. Coakley, 186 Cal. App. 2d 258, 261, 9 Cal. Rptr. 529, 531
(1960); cf. Snider v. Snider, 200 Cal. App. 2d 741, 750, 19 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715
(1962) (opponent had filed contradictory affidavits); Schessler v. Keck, 138 Cal. App.
2d 663, 292 P.2d 314 (1956) (opponent filed affidavit but it did not contradict mov-
ant's affidavit); Maltby v. Shook, 131 Cal. App. 2d 349, 280 P.2d 541 (1955) (same).
181. CAL. PEN. CODE § ii8a (West 1970).
182. Id.
183. Id. Cf. People v. Agnew, 77 Cal. App. 2d 748, 176 P.2d 724 (1947).
184. Bauman, supra note 6, at 359.
185. Cf. Clazie v. Kinloch, 192 Cal. App. 2d 239, 13 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1961)
(supervisors acting within their discretion in constructing a bndge across a slough);




judgment. On such a motion, the party is required to make the
same prima facie showing on his own behalf that he would make at
trial. If he does not present facts on the motion for summary
judgment, how can it be held that he has competent evidence to
produce? Since the expansion of discovery procedures, the idea
that it is unfair to require this proof when the factual evidence rests
with others should no longer prevail. If one has had the opportunity
for discovery and has not pursued it, he should no longer claim a
concession. If the facts legitimately lie with the adverse party or
others, the cases make it abundantly clear that depositions, interroga-
tones, and requests for admissions can reveal the evidence. If the
litigant has not had time to secure the necessary facts, a legitimate
request for continuance of the motion for summary judgment should
be honored.
Litigants can be expected occasionally to seek relief from a
summary judgment upon the theories expounded by Bauman and
those decisions which have relied upon them. It is perhaps signifi-
cant that although the supreme court since Frye v Felder has sum-
marized the rules applicable to summary judgments in a number of
cases,180 the Frye doctrine has not been included.
Recommendations
The most basic reform could be effected easily by the courts
themselves or by the Judicial Council. They could provide that
motions for summary judgment be heard in court sessions set aside
for that purpose, with adequate time allotted before and after the
hearing for the court to consider the documentation in depth. In all
but the metropolitan courts, motions for summary judgment are
carried on the regular law and motion calendar among perhaps twenty
or twenty-five matters scheduled for hearing on law and motion day.
The court may not see the file for more than a few seconds before
the hearing, and the need to go on with the regularly scheduled cal-
endars which-follow may well preclude the detailed study required.
The first step taken by a judge in determining a motion for
summary judgment is to study the pleadings to determine the issues
to which the affidavits are directed. He also determines what ad-
missions have been made as they are always considered upon the
186. E.g., Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d
689, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970); Joslin v. Marm Mumcipal Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132,
429 P.2d 889, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
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motion.187 Under the present system, how well is he able to do fis?
In a multijudge court like the Contra Costa County Superior Court,
such motions with other law and motion matters are assigned day-by-
day to all civil trial departments. They are heard and disposed of,
along with default dissolution cases, in the period between nine o'clock
and the assigned trial calendar at ten o'clock. There are only
brief moments during wich the judge can glance through the files
in advance. With a trial in progress, there is scant tme to devote
to the review of pleadings, the careful scrutiny of affidavits, deposi-
tions or other documents properly received upon a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Upon hearing the judge too often may demand of
counsel, "Is there a triable issue; point it out if you can." Such
reliance upon counsel can be sadly misplaced.18 8  A trial court
hearing a motion for summary judgment under the circumstances in-
dicated will tend to deny it, not because the merits of the motion
may be doubtful" 9 but because the judge has not had time to con-
sider the affidavits carefully 10 He fears that hidden questions of
fact may be embodied therem.191 "If on appeal, it appears that some
factual issue exists which has been overlooked or disregarded by the
trial court, it is the duty of an appellate court to reverse the summary
judgment."'' 92
In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County central district there
have been two full time law and motion departments. Files are produced
two or more days before a hearing, and a research assistant is available
to assist in studying difficult matters of law and to organize the
material submitted on the motion. A system of tentative determina-
tion of law and motion matters, announced to counsel upon arrival
for the calendar, helps to clear the calendar by reducing unnecessary
187 See Joslin v. Mann Municipal Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 148, 429 P.2d
889, 900, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388, (1967); Newport v. City of Los Angeles, 184
Cal. App. 2d 229, 7 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1960); cf. Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Remler Co.,
179 Cal. App. 2d 700, 4 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1960).
188. Cf. Roscoe Moss Co. v. Roggero, 246 Cal. App. 2d 781, 54 Cal. Rptr. 911
(1966) (improper to grant summary judgment based on statements of counsel);
Werner v. Sargeant, 121 Cal. App. 2d 833, 264 P.2d 217 (1953).
189. See Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 62 Cal. 2d 412, 417, 398
P.2d 785, 788, 42 Cal. Rptr. 449, 453 (1965) (doubts are to be resolved against the
moving party).
190. Cf. Severmi v. Massae, 140 Cal. App. 2d 567, 295 P.2d 472 (1956) (failure
to consider affidavits properly).
191. Cf. Silver Land & Dev. Co. v. California Land Title Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d
241, 56 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1967) (complex affidavits resulted in court determining
fact issues rather than leaving them for trial).
192. Id. at 244, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 180,
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oral arguments. Hence, the motions for summary judgment may re-
ceive adequate presentation, consideration and study. Any problem
created by the filing of responding affidavits at the time of hearing
can be met by appropriate continuances. 193
This system is not impeached by the fact that many of the sum-
mary judgments granted by this trial court have been overturned.
In relation to the volume of cases passed upon, it may be asserted
confidently that over a ten year period the ratio of summary judgment
reversals to the total is small. As a matter of judicial administration,
time is well spent if trial court time has been preserved for meritorious
matters by eliminating cases which should have been decided by
summary judgment.
The second reform, like the first, rests in the hands of the
courts in the first instance. Too little attention has been paid to the
adequate employment of the partial summary judgment. It may well
be that on a motion for summary judgment the moving party makes
an adequate showing as to many issues but fails to establish com-
pletely the right to the judgment. The court can declare the elements
of proof upon which there is no triable issue and by order limit the
trial to the disputed issues found to exist. Trial time would be cut
down by limiting a case to essentials. 194
Third, there is great need for reiteration by the supreme court
of the necessary standards pertaining to the sufficiency of affidavits
under section 437c. Although the supreme court has not deviated
from the statute nor have several courts of appeal, there are still too
many cases recognizing noncomplying affidavits of resisting parties. Con-
fusion has been created by the supreme court's denial of hearings to
decisions of opposite polarity upon this question. The matter could
be most expeditiously resolved by the supreme court if in the first
appropriate case the full language of Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Pren-
tice"' 5 were reiterated as the the full statement of the principle, together
with any necessary emphasis that resisting affidavits must contain evi-
dentiary facts to raise issues requiring trial.
Fourth, the rule that the allegations of the opposimg affidavits
are to be considered true should be abrogated. Better still, all refer-
ence to such presumptive truth should be dropped, since truth or
193. A local court rule requiring the filing of responding affidavits in advance of
the date set for the hearing has been held unauthorized. Albermont Petroleum, Ltd.
v. Cunningham, 186 Cal. App. 2d 84, 9 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1960).
194. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
195. 19 Cal. 2d 553, 122 P.2d 264 (1942).
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falsity is not a question to be determined upon the motion for sum-
mary judgment. A credibility issue should not be suggested to in-
hibit the procedure.
Fifth, since provisions for extensive discovery are now available,
the failure or inability of the party resisting the motion for summary
judgment to controvert evidence allegedly under the control of the
adverse party does not and should not result m denial of a motion
for summary judgment if otherwise sufficient. This presupposes that
there has been a reasonable opportunity for discovery by the respond-
ing party, or that having such opportunity, he did not make use of
it or is still unable to controvert the showing made.
There will be occasions when an eager plaintiff, without wait-
ing for an aswer, will launch a motion for summary judgment which
finds the defendant surprised and unprepared. Faced with this situa-
tion the tendency of some courts has been to deny the motion out
of hand, since it may later be renewed. 96 A better procedure would
be to grant the responding party a reasonable time in which to present
his opposition, upon proper request, and to continue the motion m
the meantime. 197  Again, if the discretion of the court hearing the
motion cannot be relied upon to take such action, the Judicial Council
by rule might well provide for such continuances. Judge Zack has
urged that legislative provisions make one continuance a matter of
right.19 8
Sixth, a jurisprudential study is needed. Its purpose would be to
determine the eventual outcome in the trial court after an appellate
court has reversed a summary judgment and remanded the cause for
trial. Has the party overturning the summary judgment done any
better or has the net result been settlement of the cause? To evaluate
the summary judgment procedure, we need basic data. How many
such judgments have been granted and denied in both the municipal
and superior courts for which such data can be obtained? How many
have been appealed to the appellate departments of our superior
courts? What is the record of affirmances and reversals there? It
would be hoped that such data not only would implement our knowl-
196. In Aguirre v. Southern Pac. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 636, 43 Cal. Rptr. 73
(1965), an earlier motion for summary judgment had been dismissed by the trial
judge on the ground that discovery was not complete. This would appear to be within
the discretion of the judge, conferred by section 437c.
197 See Whitson v. LaPay, 153 Cal. App. 2d 584, 589, 315 P.2d 45, 49 (1957)
(several continuances granted for filing of affidavits).
198. Zack, supra note 7, at 478.
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edge of the administrative efficacy of the summary judgment, but
perhaps would permit some conclusions about the justice of the
procedure.
Finally, it is suggested that both academically and practically,
the possible interrelationship of the partial summary judgment and the
procedures for the trial of separate issues should be studied.
These suggestions are made with humility and deep respect.
They rest upon several years of experience in law and motion de-
partments, where as a judge there was no reluctance to apply section
437c in cases deemed applicable. In matters of opinion, others with
like experience may very well differ, but the subject matter of the
procedure needs continual and careful reconsideration.
Conclusion
Beginning with an early case, an admonition was given that the
summary judgment procedure was drastic and to be used with caution.
This warning has been frequently restated in the cases. 199 Unfor-
tunately the term "drastic" seems to have been used as a synonym
for "arbitrary," and though "summary" relates to the absence of delay
it has been considered in the same light. The purpose of the ad-
monition, as established by the supreme court, is to remind judges
that issue determination, not fact determination, is the purpose of the
procedure, "so that it does not become a substitute for the open
trial method of determining facts. 200
If true, the folklore that the summary judgment procedure was
disfavored by the courts would have led to its repeal long ago, in-
stead of its expansion and increased use. The number of summary
judgments entered, the wide range of subject matter involved, the
expansion of the procedure to embrace reciprocal motions by plaintiff
and defendant, the enlargement of its scope to include all action and
proceedings, and the compulsion of the writ of mandate dispel that
folklore. No longer can the judge hearing the motion rely on a
broad discretion to deny it because he has neither the time nor the
patience, in the midst of a crowded law and motion calendar, to
probe the niceties of the affidavits in establishing a triable issue of
fact. After almost fifty years of application of summary judgment
199. E.g., Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. 2d 553, 556, 122 P.2d 264, 265
(1942).
200. Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 181, 474 P.2d
689, 692, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740 (1970).
November 19731 SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
procedures, prejudices have given way to the necessities of the court-
house.
The present volume of cases before the trial courts puts a great
demand upon them to make full use of the available screening pro-
cedures to terminate unmentonous cases, to discourage the perpetual
litigant and to eliminate sham causes and defenses. The courts are
increasingly aware that while the termination of a lawsuit may be
drastic to a plaintiff, it is concurrently beneficial to a defendant who
is as entitled to be relieved of a bad lawsuit as a plaintiff is to maintain
a good one. 10 Moreover, it is an imposition upon the court and
the public to send a case on for trial when it is apparent upon a
motion for summary judgment that there is no substantial issue to be
tried.
The variations in decisions in the appellate courts are undoubt-
edly the result of the exercise of the discretion assumed by the courts
to exist under section 437c. Judge Zack concludes in his magnificent
exorcism of the ghosts of the past that this discretion is now an
illusion.2" 2 But discretion is always "legal discretion," and late cases
remind judges and litigants that there are limits. Discretion confined
ceases to be discretion.
The courts themselves can re-examine the doctrines of construction
and conform decision to a uniform pattern. There is evidence that
the supreme court in construing section 437c in late cases has already
moved along this path as have some courts of appeal. The prime pur-
poses of issue determination should not be clouded by extraneous im-
portation of issues of credibility But for those instances in which
the statute is not clearly adapted to define material issues of fact through
the affidavits of the parties, it should be recognized that a sound discre-
tion still inheres in the court.
Judge Zack had advocated an elaborate statutory procedure to
force objections based upon the content of, or alleged insufficiencies of
affidavits into the open at the trial court level, making mandamus the
only method of review This solution perhaps would create complica-
tions which might not justify the pamns.
The remedy even now is in the power and discretion of the
trial judge. If upon hearing the motion it appears that the affidavits
of either party contain conclusions or hearsay, rendering them in-
effective, the deficiency can be pointed out by a short written mem-
201. Larsen v. Johannes, 7 Cal. App. 3d 491, 86 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1970).
202. Zack, supra note 7, at 452.
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orandum; leave to file amended or supplemental affidavits can then
be granted to comply with the requirement of section 437c that the
statements be made with particularity. The opposing party can be
given a similar opportunity to respond to the amendments or supple-
ments. If without an adequate excuse a party afforded such oppor-
tunity does not, or will not, supply such amendment or supplement,
the court can well conclude that he cannot.20 3
The future stabilization of summary judgment procedures seems
bound up in the question of judicial preparation. The purpose is
not only to relieve litigants of sham causes or defenses at an early
stage but also to free the courts of unmeritorious cases, in order that
justice may be done to other cases.204
Justice has no price tag. The cost of the court system is mounting.
But surely the taxpayer also has an interest in winnowing out unmen-
torious causes or defenses, and in expediting the determination of meri-
torious causes.
Every expedition of cases through the courts, consistent with just
determinations, must be employed. Those whose controversies are of
the types traditionally submitted to courts for decision are turning away
already, where speedier determinations are promised by administrative
procedures, or arbitration. Courts and lawyers should conclude that
the summary judgment procedure is a most important tool in California
jurisprudence, for litigants, lawyers and the overburdened courts.
203. See Johnson v. Banducci, 212 Cal. App. 2d 254, 260, 27 Cal. Rptr. 764,
767 (1963) (within court's discretion to permit the filing of further affidavits).
204. Wells Fargo Bank v. Kincaid, 260 Cal. App. 2d 120, 66 Cal. Rptr. 832,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 915 (1968); Estate of Kelly, 178 Cal. App. 2d 24, 2 Cal. Rptr.
634 (1960).
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